LIBRARY 

OF    THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 
Accession °"4  79 class 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/formalmaterialelOOwashrich 


THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  ELEMENTS 
OF  KANT'S  ETHICS 


COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY   CONTRIBUTIONS 

TO 

PHILOSOPHY,   PSYCHOLOGY   AND   EDUCATION 

Vol.  Ill  No.  t 


THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  ELEMENTS 


DP 


KANT'S  ETHICS 


BY 


WILLIAM  MORROW  WASHINGTON,  Pli.I). 

Sometime  Scholar  in  Philosophy  in  Columbia  University 


June,  1898 

The  Macmillan  Co.,  66  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 
Mayer  and  Muller,  Mark&rafenstrasse,  Berlin 

Price  60  cents 


£8  1 


CONTENTS 

1 
Introductory 7 

II 

The  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Morals    .    .     14 

III 
The  Critique  of  Pure  Practical  Reason      29 

IV 
The  Metaphysic  of  Ethics 63 

V 

Conclusion  (with  Scheme) 66 


86479 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  primal  fact  that  strikes  one  in  Kant's  Ethics,  leaving 
out  of  view  the  fact  that  they  are  a  necessary  part  of  his 
complete  method,  is  that  pe  is  thoroughly  animated  by  they 
spirit  of  Stoicism ;  knd  that  further,  in  this  spirit,  he  is  aim- 
ing more  particularly  at  a  refutation  of  the  contemporary 
sensationalistic  schools.  In  accomplishing  the  double  ob- 
ject called  forth  by  these  two  facts,  and  in  fitting  his  doc- 
trines into  the  terminology  of  the  critical  method,  he  had 
the  misfortune  to  express  himself  in  terms  peculiar  to  Logic  ; 
thereby  provoking  a  merely  logical  refutation,  and  one,  on 
that  account,  often  wide  of  the  mark  and  quite  blind  to  the 
ethical  truth  conveyed. 

The  terminology  thus  adopted  was  that  by  which  the 
elements  of  a  science  are  classed  under  one  of  the  two  heads 
of  Form  or  Matter.  This  division  served  Kant  doubly 
thus :  it  allowed  him  to  distinguish  as  the  Greeks  had  done, 
between  Reason,  Will  and  Spirit  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Sense,  Impulse,  Matter  and  Body  on  the  other;  at  the  same 
time  by  advocating  an  ethics  of  "  form, "(he  showed  that  he 
regarded  the  moral  law  as  a  product  of  Reasomin  contrast 
to  the  Moral  Sense  foundation  of  the  English  scnool.  For, 
he  thought,  Ethics  must  proceed  from  reason;  and  to  be  ^ 
Ethics,  must  give  a  law,  the  a  priori  product  of  pure  reason ;  / 
and  which,  therefore,  can  be  only  the  mere  concept  ox  form 
of  a  law.  On  the  other  hand,  a  doctrine  which  ignores  the 
mandatory  character  of  virtue  fills  up  the  gap  thus  left  by 
descriptions  of  virtue's  pleasantness  ;  in  which  case,  all  that  is 
71  7 


8  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [g 

accomplished  is  to  make  the  objects  of  the  will  (the  matter) 
pleasant,  and  their  attainment  desired ;  therefore  we  must 
rule  out  absolutely  from  Ethics  the  matter  of  desire. 

In  Kant's  use  of  the  word,  there  is  but  one^  derivation  for 
the  matter  of  desire ;  it  is  the  sense-given,  hence  is  par- 
ticular, empirical  and  merely  contingent.  For  "  Form,"  on 
the  other  hand,  we  may  find  two  sources,  Reason  and  the 
Understanding,  used  to  denote  respectively  the  faculty 
which  deals  with  Ideas  notjbased  on  intuition,  but  produced 
from  its  own  spontaneity,  and  that  which  has  no  conceptions 
except  those  derived  from  sensible  intuition. 

When  he  reached  the  period  of  his_ejhi£ajjwntin^;s,  Kant 
had  finished  his  investigation  of  the  limits  of  the  Understand- 
ing, and  Reason  became  of  first  importance  as  a  field  of  re- 
search. As  a  result,  the  Understanding  falls  into  the  back- 
ground, and  occupies  a  somewhat  equivocal  position.  As  a 
faculty  of  abstraction,  itf  belongs  to  the  formal  world  and  is 
concerned  with  the  form  of  knowledge.)  As  opposed  to  the 
intelligible  intuitionless  world  in  which  Reason  dwells  by  its 
purely  spontaneous  nature,  Understanding  ranks  with  the 
sensible  world  of  intuitions.  (The  division  of  intelligible  and 
sensible  worlds  is  the  one  most  prominently  before  Kant's 
mind  in  his  Ethics.)/  Nevertheless  his  phraseology  is  not  so 
constant  as  not  to  allow  of  a  frequent  use  of  the  division  be- 
tween Sensibility  and  Understanding.  Form  thus  comes  to 
have  two  distinct  references.  It  may  be  (i)  merely  the 
universal  to  be  arrived  at  by  abstraction  from  the  particulars 
given  in  intuition;  (2)  the  rational,  as  distinct  from  the 
sensible  and  intelligible,  and  not  derived  from  intuition. 
In  the  former  sense,  Kant  is  a  conceptualist;  though  there 
is  an  intimation,  in  his  conception  of  the  Categories,  that  if 
the  universal  does  not  lie  in  the  mind  before  the  particular  is 
presented  in  intuition,  at  least  the  mind  is  ready  beforehand 
for  such  presentation. 


gl  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  g 

(in  his  Ethics,  Kant  is  carried  clear  into  the  camp  of  Real- 
ism :  the  universal,  as  a  law,  exists  apart  from  the  particular 
and  can  never  be  found  in  the  particular.  But  it  exists  so 
only  in  our  conception  of  a  rational  being.  J 

This  last  qualification  denotes  the  psychological  aspect  ot 
Kant's  attitude,  and  is  really  the  solution  of  the  whole  ques- 
tion as  to  his  position  on  this  point,  into  which  his  distinc- 
tion between  Form  and  Matter  compels  us  to  inquire.  For 
while  Kant  uses  this  division  as  thoroughly  as  any  scholastic 
could  desire,  he  never  takes  the  scholastic's  ontological  point 
of  view.  It  is  not  to  decide  priority  or  reality  of  existence 
that  leads  him  to  make  this  abstraction,  but  the  necessity  of 
denoting  the  different  psychological  sources  of  ideas,  of  their 
causes,  and  of  concepts.  Where  or  how  the  moral  law  ex- 
ists, Kant  did  not  care  to  inquire.  That/it  existed,  prior  to 
all  experience  in  the  conception  of  thev  very  nature  of  a 
rational  being,  was  enough.  So  far  it  had  reality  as  cer- 
tainly as  did  the  Ideas  of  Plato.  Without  being  at  all  con- 
cerned, therefore,  in  the  ontological  quarrel  of  Nominalism 
and  Realism,  Kant's  Ethics  denote  a  strongly^realistic  stand- 
point. 

The  difference  between  Matter  and  Form,  in  Kant's  con- 
ception of  them,  is  the  same  as  in  Aristotle's ;  but  he  never 
uses  the  terms  in  the  Aristotelian  sense.  Instead  of  form 
and  matter  being  coeternal  principles  of  things,  they  are  now 
elements  of  knowledge.  Form  is  that  element  supplied  by 
Understanding  and  Reason ;  matter  is  that  given  through 
the  senses.  The  sense-given  can  never  be  anything  but  the 
particular,  contingent  and  a  posteriori.  The  necessary  and 
universal,  from  its  very  nature,  must  be  the  product  of  the 
reason,  of  the  pure  reason  a  priori. 

That  place  where  Kant  comes  nearest  to  the  scholastic 
meaning  of  the  terms  is  in  his  distinction  between  formal  and 
material  knowledge  and  in  the  division  of  the  sciences  on  this 


I0  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  |^I0 

basis.  This  is  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  work ;  all  the 
conceptions  are  present  that  appear  at  any  time,  but  Kant  is 
here  insisting  on  the  a  priori  character  of  the  one,  the  empir- 
ical, of  the  other  sort  of  knowledge.  Accordingly  that  idea 
is  not  so  strongly  brought  out,  which  advancingly  distin- 
guishes his  use  of  the  terms  from  the  traditional  one.  This 
is  the  conception  that  matter  and  form  are  not  eternal  prin- 
ciples of  the  same  thing.  There  is,  on  the  contrary,  nothing 
in  Kant  to  prevent  the  supposition  that  they  may  exist  apart, 
though,  indeed,  form  without  matter  would  be  empty,  and 
matter  without  form  would  have  no  meaning  for  us.  Aris- 
totle's form  and  matter  do  not  exclude  each  other :  form  is 
matter  in  a  higher  stage  of  development;  matter  is  form  in 
a  lower  stage.  In  Kant's  conception  they  are  fixed ;.  form 
is,  as  it  were,  the  mental  mold  through  which  matter  passes 
in  its  cognition  by  the  mind.  Form  is  the  determination ; 
matter,  that  which  is  determined. 

We  have,  therefore,  two  different  conceptions  of  form,  the 
traditional  and  the  Kantian.  The  difference  may  be  illus- 
trated thus :  in  the  scholastic  meaning,  the  form  of  a  sentence 
is  that  determination  of  words  which  is  essential  to  their 
becoming  a  sentence,  i.  e.y  there  must  be  a  subject,  a  predi- 
cate verb,  and  if  the  verb  be  transitive,  an  object,  and  so  on. 
The  matter  of  such  a  sentence  is  the  specific  subject,  predi- 
cate verb  and  object.  In  Kant's  use,  the  matter  is  both  this 
form  and  matter,  if  these  together  form  part  of  a  cognition. 
The  form  is  that  in  the  conceiving  mind  whereby  they  are 
cognized  ;   it  is  that  by  which  mind  legislates  for  nature. 

Thus, /the  Categorical  Imperative  is  the  form  of  the  law. )  In 
the  former  sense,  it  is  comparable  to  the  formal  syllogism. 
That  is,  fit  is  not  the  law,  but  the  form  in  which  all  maxims 
on  which  one  acts  must  be  molded  in  order  that  their  con- 
sistency may  be  tested  :1  just  as  all  reasoning  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  formal  syllogism  in  order  to  test  its  validity. 


!  j  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  \  i 

•Jin  the  second,  or  Kantian  use,  the  form  of  the  law  is  a  law: 
a  law  because  it  expresses  moral  necessity)  and,  being 
necessary,  proceeds  a  priori  from  reason  alone ;  the  form 
of  a  law  because  it  is  given  by  pure  reason,  and  is,  therefore, 
merely  the  idea  of  a  law  in  general. 

In  Kant's  own  use  we  may  distinguish  two  sorts  of  form ; 
the  first  is  the  category,  whose  correlative  matter  are  the 
objects  of  sensible  intuition.  Form  and  matter  in  this  sense 
are  the  subject-matter  of  physics,  regarded  as  the  science  of 
the  whole  realm  of  nature  and  speculations  thereon.  Besides 
the  category  as  a  form  of  judgment,  the  mind  also  deals  in 
Ideas  for  which  no  sensible  intuition  can  possibly  be  found. 
On  this  account  Reason  in  its  speculative  use,  i.  e.  the 
Understanding,  rejects  them  as  elements  of  knowledge  at  all; 
they  are  "  conceptions  without  perceptions,"  and  conse- 
quently empty.  Reason  as  deliberative  Will,  on  the  other 
hand,  settles  the  account  of  such  Ideas  very  differently  by 
making  them  the  foundation  stones  of  rational  morality. 
The  understanding  can  deal  only  with  the  materials  pro- 
vided it  by  the  sensibility.  Rational  Will,  on  the  contrary, 
produces  its  Ideas  from  its  own  spontaneity.  It  is  therefore 
absurd  to  attempt  to  find,  corresponding  to  these  forms,  a 
matter  in  the  meaning  previously  given  the  term,  namely, 
the  sense-given.  We  must  find  a  new  and  broader  definition 
for  matter. 

It  is  the  very  nature  of  the  Ideal  Conceptions  of  the  reason 
to  be  realized.  "  In  order  to  extend  a  pure  cognition  prac- 
tically, there  must  be  an  a  priori  purpose  given,  that  is,  an 
end  as  object  of  the  will."  ■  That  is,  we  may  call  this  pur- 
posed end  the  matter  of  an  Ideal.  We  see,  therefore,  that 
both  understanding  and  reason  have  an  object  (matter); 
but  that  of  the  former  is  Gegenstand,  the  given  in  intuition, 
that  of  the  latter  is  Zweck,  "  an  object  possible  of  realization 
through  Freedom"  (spontaneity).     From  this  point  of  view 


I2  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [I2 

the  department  of  thought  under  which  the  Ideas  fall  is  that 
of  purpose,  of  ends  to  be  attained ;  which  is  Ethics.  (  Under 
Ethics,  consequently,  is  understood  all  that  does  not  come 
within  the  domain  of  nature  (physics),  where  purpose  is 
not  possible,  j  Of  the  nature  of  the  Ideal  as  the  subject- 
matter  proper  of  Ethics,  we  shall  learn  more  in  the  consid- 
eration of  the  chapter  on  H  the  Object  of  pure  practical 
Reason,"  and  in  the  Dialectic. 

The  length  to  which  Kant  carried  the  abstraction  of  the  a 
priori  and  empirical  elements  of  knowledge,  and  in  ethics 
especially,  his  passion  to  get  a  binding  universal,  abstracted 
altogether  from  time-given  circumstances,  forced  him  into  a 
position  continually  more  marked  by  realism.  His  hatred  of 
the  sense-given  increased  correspondingly.  So  that  "  mater- 
ialistic" has  for  him  all  the  meaning  attached  in  common 
parlance  to  that  term  as  opposed  to  intellectual  or  spiritual. 
It  represents  all  that  is  base  and  sensualistic  in  principles. 
This  sense  is  not  brought  out  in  a  well  defined  way,  but  is 
seen  most  clearly  in  such  affirmations  as :  "  all  material 
practical  principles  as  such  are  of  one  and  the  same  kind, 
and  come  under  the  general  principle  of  self-love  or  private 
happiness;  "2  "the  direct  opposite  of  the  principle  of  moral- 
ity (obtains),  when  the  principle  of  private  happiness  is  made 
the  determining  principle  of  the  will."3  This  bias  led  Kant 
to  limit  almost  altogether  the  word  matter  to  the  sense- 
given,  although  it  includes  any  object,  whether  of  thought  or 
sense. 

(  Formal  Ethics  is  the  product  of  pure  practical  reason  a 
priori.  )To  find  the  elements  of  it  we  must  analyze  the  term 
"morality;"  to  establish  its  reality  and  authority  we  must 
proceed  synthetically.  The  latter  task  is  the  Critique's. 
The  former  is  that  of  the  Grundlegung;4  which  is  accord- 
ingly an  analysis  of  the  formal  presuppositions  which  must 
necessarily  be  found  in  morality  if  it  is  to  have  reality,  i.  e., 


j  3  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT 'S  E  THICS  1 3 

is  to  be  regarded  as  the  science  of  Law  and  Duty.     To  this 
analysis  we  will  now  proceed. 

1  Abbott's  Kant,  4th  ed.,  p.  231. 
8  Abbott,  p.  108. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  124;  Kirchman,  K.  d.  prac.  Ver.,  S.  41. 

*  I  have  throughout  chosen  to  call  the  "  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Meta- 
physic  of  Morals  "  by  the  first  word  of  the  German  title. 


II 


THE  GRUNDLEGUNG :    FORMAL   PRESUPPOSITIONS    OF 
MORALITY 

WE  are  immediately  introduced  to  the  formal  and  material 
as  elements  of  knowledge  by  the  statement  that  it  was  on 
them  as  a  basic  principle  that  Greek  philosophy  divided 
knowledge  into  the  three  departments  of  Physics,  Ethics  and 
Logic.  The  definitions  here  given  show  that  Kant  already 
intends  to  support  the  conclusions  later  reached  in  the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  and  foreshadowed  in  that  of  the 
Pure  Reason ;  namely,  that  Physics  is  the  science  of 
Natures  Ethics  of  the  supersensible  (corresponding  to  Greek 
"  Metapnysics  ")  ;  that  the  latter  can  establish  those  Ideas 
of  reason  to  which  Metaphysics  had  failed  to  give  reality) 
Logic  is  the  underlying  science  which  prescribes  how  one 
must  think  in  the  other  two ;  i.  e.  it  supplies  the  form. 
While  thus  identifying  his  use  of  formal  and  material 
with  the  Greek,  Kant  from  the  beginning  uses  the  terms  in 
his  own  fashion  by  adding  the  psychological  element  which 
had  been  absent  from  the  former  meaning.  For  logic  is 
now  not  only  the  philosophy  of  forms,  but  of  forms  of  the 
understanding  and  of  reason:  besides  being  empty,  it  must 
come  a  priori  from  pure  reason.  Otherwise  it  would  not  be, 
as  it  is,  valid   for  all  thought  and  capable  of  demonstration. 

When  such  a  pure  philosophy  is  applied  to  definite 
objects  of  the  understanding,  as  found  in  Ethics  and  Physics, 
it  is  called  Metaphysic.  Metaphysic  is  thus  material  be- 
cause applied  to  a  specific  object ;  but  is  also  formal,  inas- 
14  [14 


I  5  ]  ELEMENTS  CF  KANT'S  E  TIIICS  f  5 

much  as  it  is  not  empirical,  and  is  a  systematization  of  the 
rational  parts  of  physics  and  ethics.  Tabulating  Kant's 
statements,  we  have  the  following  division  of  sciences  as  re- 
gards their  form  and  matter : 

Philosophy 


Pure 

_  .  —                                .  ^ 

Empirical 

Formal 
(Logic) 

Material 
(Metaphysic) 

Anthropology               Experimental 
(Material  Ethics)                 Physics 

of  Ethics            of  Physics 

Rechtslehre              Tugendlehre 
(formal)                '   (material) 

It  is  seen  that  in  Kant's  opinion  there  are  two  metaphysics, 
those  of  etjiics  and  phvj>ics ;  and  in  each  of  the  sciences 
there  can  be  but  one  metaphysic.  The  division  of  Ethics 
into  Rechtslehre  and  Tugendlehre  (formal  and  material)  is 
made  in  the  Metaphysic  of  Ethics,  and  we  have  no  concern 
with  it  at  present. 

The  intent  of  this  subdividing  is  to  bring  out  Kant's  con- 
ception that/in  formal  (pure)  ethics  only  can  a  law,  neces- 
sary and  universal,  be  found.  \  Any  principle  that  needs  time- 
given  conditions  to  develop  and  establish  it,  and  cannot, 
therefore,  be  justified  a  priori ',  is  material  and  not  able  to 
furnish  a  necessary  law.  . 

/Of  the  metaphysic  of  Ethics,,  the  subject-matter  is  the  Will  ;j 
rtbt  the  will  generally,  as  treated  in  psychology,  but  a  pos- 
sible, pure  will.  And  the  purpose  of  the  metaphysic  is  the 
finding  of  the  supreme  canon  of  morality,  a  necessary  and 
universal  law,  the  ground  of  whose  a  priority  in  a  more  ex-  \ 
plicitly  ethical  sense  is  its  necessity  to  moral  experience. 

The  method  adopted  by  Kant  to  attain  his  end  is  to  find 
by  analysis  all  that  is  contained,  presupposed  that  is,  in  the 


1 6  THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  TERIAL  [  t  g 

vterm  rational  morality.  This  analysis  will  furnish  the  foun- 
dation of  a  metaphysic  of  morals.  The  concepts  found  to 
inhere  in  "morality"  will  be  such  as  are  necessarily  deter- 
mined before  there  can  be  any  morality ;  i.  e.y  the  formal 
conditions  of  morality.  To  find  these  conditions  is  the  task 
of  the  "  Grundlegung."  The  subsequent  proof  of  the  real 
existence  of  morality  will  be  the  work  of  the  Critique. 
/  The  first  condition  of  morality,  that  which  conditions  all 
others,  is  the  Good  Will.1  The  Good  Will  is  absolute  good.) 
As  such,  it  is  formal;  that  is,  a  possible  will  which  sets  forth 
what  the  actual  will  ought  to  be,  and  thus  determines  the 
formal  conditions  of  a  will's  becoming  good.  Not  to  violate 
the  requirements  of  formal  morality  ,(it  must  be  a  will  which 
gives  only  universal  laws,,  being  indeterminate  as  regards 
specific  objects  and  containing  the  mere  form  of  volition.2 
By  "  absolute "  Kant  means  the  unconditioned,  of  which 
he  gives  two  definitions :  3  (i)  the  supreme  unconditioned 
condition  which  is  the  condition  of  all  others  and  is  not  sub- 
ordinate to  any;  (2)  that  whole  which  is  not  a  part  of  a 
greater  whole  of  the  same  kind  (the  unrelated).  He  applies 
the  former  definition  to  the  Good  Will:  it  is  the  supreme 
good  and  the  condition  of  every  other  (without  which  they 
,  could  not  exist),  but  is  not  the  sole  and  complete  good.4 
\  "A  good  will  is  good  not  because  of  what  it  performs,  but 
simply  by  virtue  of  the  volition,  that  is,  it  is  good  in  itself. y5 
Not  that  it  is  unrelated,  but  that  its  goodness  is  not  in  the 
least  affected  by  its  relation  to  anything  else ;  and  that  the 
fact  that  it  attains  material  good  is  not  what  makes  its  voli- 
tion good.  The  will  can  become  formal  good  only  through 
a  formal  reason  (that  is,  one  abstracted  from  ends),  namely, 
the  fact  that  is  the  unconditioned  condition  of  all  other  prin- 
ciples of  pure  morality.6 

In  opposition  to  this  formal  good  men  have  tried  to  up- 
hold a  material   good   based  on  the  empirical  principle   of 


I  j  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KAN  T'S  E  THICS  j  7 

Happiness.  Their  position  is  refuted  by  the  fact  of  the 
existence  of  reason  and  its  office,  which  is  not  the  attain- 
ment and  preservation  of  happiness.  The  Will  is  not  at  first 
defined  further  than  to  distinguish  it  from  wish; 7  and  to 
affirm  that  it  acts  according  to  concepts  or  principles,  and 
is  consequently  a  deliberative  will  or  practical  reason.8  In 
the  Metaphysic  of  Ethics  a  distinction  is  made  between 
rational  and  elective  will.  The  elective  will  is  of  two  kinds, 
human  which  is  merely  affected  by  sensible  desire,  and 
animal  which  is  altogether  determined  by  such.9  "Will"  at 
first  has  a  narrower  meaning,  being  denied  to  all  but  rational 
beings ;  and  being  indeed  the  faculty  of  acting  according  to 
principles.  Later,  the  Rational  Will  alone  is  the  practical 
reason,  and  gives  laws:  elective  will  gives  maxims.  Elec- 
tive will  alone  is  free ;  /rational  will  is  neither  free  nor  unfreey 
Animals  have  no  free-will,  being  determined  by  physical 
impulses.  Rational  will  through  its  laws,  which  become 
subjectively  the  maxims  of  the  elective  will,  controls  the 
latter ;  or  would  do  so  were  it  not  weakened  by  disuse  and 
submission  to  the  inclinations. 

Proceeding  from  the  conception  of  the  Good  Will  as  the 
first  presupposition  of  morality,  Kant  takes  up  the  notion  of. 
Duty.  fThe  idea  of  Duty  involves  that  of  a  will  3°  unless 
there  be  a  cause  able  to  choose  its  own  ends  there  can  be  no 
responsibility  for  results.  (An  act  to  be  moral  must  be  done 
from  a  sense  of  duty,^not  from  inclination ;  and  such  an  act 
derives  its  moral  worth  not  from  the  matter,  the  end  in  view, 
but  altogether  from  the  principle  on  which  one  acts.  Duty 
is  opposed  to  inclination,  and  has  no  pleasantness  connected 
with  it ;  reluctance  to  accept  the  obligation  being  one  of  its 
essentials.11  Kant  asserts  that  consciousness  of  his  moral 
worth,  1,  tf.Ythat  he  can  act  on  principles  in  obedience  to 
Duty,  is  man's  highest  good ;  j  but  affirms  also  that  one  can- 
not be  certain  of  this  worth,  since  he  cannot  tell  whether  he 


1 8  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [jg 

is  acting  from  Duty  alone;  "we  cannot  observe  the  maxims 
themselves,  not  even  always  in  ourselves."  n 

Duty  is  defined  in  terms  of  Law,  which  is  the  next  step  in 
the  analysis.     For  Duty  is  but  a  species  of  the  wider  term 

tLaw;  a  law  that  applies  only  to  free  rational  beings. 
Duty  is  the  necessity  of  acting  from  respect  for  the  law."/4 
This  duty  is  a  conception  of  formal  morality ;  it  is  not  de- 
rived from  experience,  and  without  it  no  moral  experience 
is  possible.  That  it  is  a  conception,  and  one  a  priori,  in- 
volves a  contradiction  of  the  English  School,  which  had  made 
it  a  sense.  Later,  in  the  Metaphysic  of  Ethics,  Kant  dis- 
tinguishes further  between  formal  and  material  Duty.  The 
former  is  obligation,  "  the  necessity  of  a  free  action  under 
a  categorical  imperative  of  reason."15  Material  duty  "  is  the 
action  to  which  a  person  is  bound.  It  is  therefore  the  mat- 
ter of  obligation."16 

The  notion  of  Law  is  implied  in  that  of  Duty,  as  the  latter 
follows  on  the  conception  of  the  Good  Will.  "  The  notion 
of  duty  stands  in  immediate  relation  to  a  law,"17  and  "  is  in 
itself  already  the  notion  of  a  constraint  of  the  free  elective 
will  by  the  law."18  (For  Kant,  Ethics  is  the  science  of  Law ; 
of  a  law  expressing  itself  concretely  in  the  single  word, 
Duty.\  That  is  the  form  every  law  must  take  in  order  to 
have  its  weight  as  a  moral  law.  It  is  a  priori,  one  being  not 
even  a  moral  being  till  he  has  experienced  it.  {To  be  moral, 
one  must  have  a  sense  of  duty  to  start  wit/h  is  his  dictum. 

/"  A  law  (a  moral  practical  law)  is  a  proposition,  which 
contains  a  categorical  imperative  (a  command). "\  Such 
a  proposition  is  objective  and  universal — a  principle  for  all 
rational  nature.  There  are  also  subjective  principles,  called 
<maxims.  They  are  the  principles  the  individual  chooses  for 
himselft  If  his  choice  of  a  principle  is  in  accord  with  uni- 
versal law,  the  maxim  becomes  an  objective  law  subjectively 
practical,   and  the   resulting  act  is  legal,     fro  be  moral  it 


j  p]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT '5  E  THICS  j  g 

must  be  done  for  the  sake  of  the  law  as  well  as  in  conformity 
to  it.)  A  maxim  based  on  desire  is  material,  incapable  of 
universality,  and  immoral.  Accordingly,  we  have  the  com- 
mand:^" Act  on  a  maxim  which  can  also  hold  good  as  a 
universal  law.  Every  maxim  which  is  not  capable  of  being 
so  is  contrary  to  morality."  ^J  If  the  law  is  to  be  a  priori, 
it  must  be  separated  from  everything  empirical  and  material. 
"A  practical  precept  which  contains  a  material  (and  there- 
fore empirical)  condition  must  never  be  reckoned  a  practical 
law."21  Kant  rather  gives  the  impression  that  a  maxim  is  due 
to  the  prompting  of  inclination  and  wants.  This  results  from 
his  desire  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  such  a  maxim  cannot 
be  a  law.  On  the  contrary,  however,  the  law  itself  is  a 
maxim,  inasmuch  as  it  cannot  become  specific  except  through 
the  use  by  the  will  of  a  maxim.  But  a  maxim  cannot  be  a 
law,  and  the  will  is  immoral,  if  sensible  desire  is  the  motive. 
The  only  way  that  a  maxim  (as  principle)  can  become  a 
formal  law  is  that  it  have  no  other  other  source  in  the  will 
than  a  sense  of  duty ;  any  other  motive  would  not  come 
from  reason,  but  from  a  desire  for  an  object  of  the  senses, 
and  hence  would  not  be  conceptual  or  formal. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  view  we  take  of  the  law  is  that  we 
respect  it.  Respect  is  a  feeling ;  but  it  is  not  a  species  of 
sensible  desire.  It  depends  on  the  conception  of  the  law, 
merely  as  to  its  form,  not  on  account  of  any  object,  as  do 
all  other  feelings.  It  is  therefore  formal,  and  necessary  to 
morality.  "  Respect  is  a  tribute  which  we  cannot  refuse  to 
merit,  whether  we  will  or  not."22 

(The  moral  law  is  a  formal  determining  principle  of  action 
by  pure  practical  reason^  At  the  same  time,  it  is  a  material 
objective  determining  principle  of  the  objects  of  actions  as 
called  good  and  evil ;  it  is  also  a  subjective  determining 
principle,  that  is,  a  motive.23  That  is  to  say,  it  determines 
formally  whether  the  will  is  good  or  evil ;  materially,  whether 


20  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [2o 

the  end  is  good  or  not;  and  is  also  a  motive  to  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  law.  The  formijla  of  the  law  is  repeated  many 
times,  and  in  various  forms  according  to  the  point  under 
consideration.  As  we  shall  see,  they  reduce  themselves  to 
three.  The  first  and  fundamental  statement  of  it  is :  &ct  so 
that  the  maxim  of  your  will  may  be  by  your  will  a  universal 
law.  This  is  in  Kant's  view  the  only  valid  principle  of  a 
law  which  is  to  be  merely  the  idea  of  a  law  in  general ;) 
and  is  on  that  account  pure  and  formal,  not  admitting  any 
empirical  (sensible)  motive  and  not  having  an  end  in  view. 
For  it  "  does  not  concern  the  matter  of  the  action  or  its 
intended  result,  but  its  form  and  the  principle  of  which  it  is 
itself  a  result."  24 

There  is  an  end  in  view,  the  attainment  and  preservation 
of  universal  law.  But  this  is  a  logical  not  an  ethical  end, 
i.  e.y  it  is  a  test  of  truth,  not  a  state  of  being  to  be  arrived  at. 
If  it  were  ethical,  Kant  would  be  involved  in  the  inconsistency 
of  making  social  morality  (for  that  is  the  seemingly  implied 
purpose  of  the  law)  of  chief  importance  in  his  system.  At 
first  sight,  it  seems  intended  the  law  shall  operate  by  devel- 
oping in  the  individual  a  large  sense  of  responsibility,  and 
then  throwing  on  him,  as  it  were,  the  legislation  of  the  uni- 
verse. But  in  its  strictest  interpretation,  the  law  is  more 
formal  than  that,  and  demands  only  logical  consistency :  a 
will  always  impelled  by  reason  alone,  and  conduct  not  vary- 
ing to  suit  the  behest  of  contingent  desires. 

The  law  as  stated  above  is  called  technically  the  Categori- 
cal Imperative.  Besides  it  there  are  hypothetical  imperatives. 
These,  of  whatever  kind,  are  material,  because  looking  to 
a  specific  end,  and  hence  have  no  place  in  pure  morality. 
All  the  Imperatives  are  summarized  in  three  classes ;  two 
which  are  material,  the  technical  and  the  pragmatic  or  pru- 
dential, and  the  moral,  which  alone  is  formal. 

The  question  now  arises,  How  are  these  imperatives  pos- 


2 1  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  2 1 

sible?  How  can  we  conceive  of  this  obligation  of  the  will 
which  is  in  the  notion  of  an  imperative  ?  !^~-  As  to  the  tech- 
nical imperative,  the  question  is  easy  of  answer :  no  obliga- 
tion is  put  upon  the  will  unless  it  is  desired  to  attain  a  certain 
object.  /  In  the  end,  therefore,  lies  all  the  force  of  the  com- 
mand, and  the  imperative  is  conditional  upon  the  desire  for 
that  end.)  With  the  prudential  imperative,  whose  end  is 
happiness',  the  case  is  different.  The  technical  imperative  is 
an  analytic  proposition ;  the  prudential  is  synthetic  and  in- 
definite, as  is  the  moral.  To  distinguish  it  from  the  latter, 
therefore,  Kant  forthwith  denies  that  it  is  an  imperative  at 
all :  26  the  precepts  of  happiness  are  necessary  but  not  moral, 
i.  e.y  there  is  no  universal  law  with  which  they  can  be  a 
priori  conformed,  as  is  the  case  with  moral  maxims. 

When  we  come  to  consider  the  possibility  of  moral  imper- 
atives, the  matter  is  again  different.  These  are  necessary, 
they  unconditionally  oblige  the  will.  It  is  not  possible,  how- 
ever, to  show  this  necessity  by  examples  from  experience, 
inasmuch  as  prudence  may  always  be  supposed  in  such  cases 
to  have  been  the  motive,  instead  of  Duty.  We  have,  there- 
fore, to  investigate  a  priori  the  possibility  of  the  categorical 
imperative. 

First,  we  inquire  "  whether  the  mere  conception  of  a  cate- 
gorical imperative  may  not  perhaps  supply  us  also  with  the 
formula  of  it," 27  leaving  the  problem  of  its  possibility  till  later. 
The  content  of  a  hypothetical  imperative  is  given  accord- 
ing to  the  conditional  circumstances.  That  of  a  categorical 
is  in  its  very  conception;  it  is  (i )  the  law,  (2)  the  necessity 
that  the  maxims  of  the  will  shall  conform  to  the  law.  That 
is,  an  unconditional  imperative  will  contain  the  command 
that  man  shall  do  his  Duty,  and,  in  the  second  place,  one 
can  learn  from  its  formula  what  his  duty  is,  namely,  that  he 
will  according  to  a  universal  law.  In  Kant's  opinion,  there- 
fore, that  which  he  had  started    out  to  seek,  namely,   the 


22  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  T22 

conception  of  "  the  obligation  of  the  will  which  the  imperative 
expresses,"  is  morally  an  unconditional  necessity.  And  moral 
necessity  consists  in  this,  thatfone  must  will  as  though  willing 
universally.^ 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  [from  the  merely  logical  point 
of  view  the  categorical  imperative  in  conformity  with  its 
formal  and  empty  character  is  not  a  law,  but  the  principle 
on  which  one  acts  morally]  the  form  which  a  maxim  must 
take  in  order  to  be  a  law:  just  (as  before  stated)  as  the  for- 
mal syllogism  is  the  mode  in  which  all  reasoning  can  be  pre- 
sented, and  must  be,  if  its  validity  is  to  be  tested;  so  every 
maxim  on  which  one  acts  (not  every  action)  must  be  able 
to  take  this  universal  form  in  order  to  be  formally  moral. 
But  such  morality  would  be  only  formal ;  it  would  not  be 
material,  any  more  than  a  formally  valid  syllogism  is  a  test  of 
material  truth.  Or  to  take  an  analogy  from  grammar,  any 
sentence  correct  or  incorrect,  so  it  be  a  sentence,  can  be  put 
into  a  diagram  (universalized)  ;  but  when  it  has  been  dia- 
grammed you  have  merely  determined  whether  it  is  a  sen- 
tence or  not.  If  it  it  is  grammatically  incorrect  to  start  with, 
it  remains  so  without  regard  to  the  universal  form.  The 
fact  is  so  plain  as  to  lead  one  to  think  that  Kant  must  have 
meant  something  else  by  his  appeal  to  the  form  of  the  law. 
Kant  avoids  the  difficulty  thus  made  apparent  by  denying 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  material  morality.  To  take 
circumstances,  results  and  what-not  into  consideration  is  to 
destroy  the  proper  function  of  Ethics.  If,  we  ask,  the  good- 
ness of  the  will  is  not  to  be  learned  from  its  results,  the  tree 
is  not  to  be  known  by  its  fruits,  what  test  can  be  furnished? 
(An  immoral  maxim,  he  replies,  will  contradict  itself;  con- 
sistency is  the  test  of  goodness.)  One  may  still  object,  how- 
ever, that  to  learn  that  an  evil  maxim  is  self-destructive, 
whether  general  or  particular,  one  must  go  outside  the  form. 
This  is  to  interpret  Kant  in  the   narrowest  sense,  accord- 


23]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  2$ 

ing  to  his  own  analogy  from  logic ;  there  is,  however,  an 
ethical  truth  in  his  doctrine  which  we  hope  to  discover 
further  on  ;  consideration  of  it  is  postponed  out  of  regard  for 
the  fact  that  Kant  probably  became  aware  of  it  only  as  he 
gradually  realized  the  weakness  of  his  more  formal  doctrine. 
This  point  is  certain,  that  in  Kant's  opinion  the  goodness  of 
the  will  consists  in  its  consistency  with  something  or  other ; 
just  at  present  it  is  the  consistency  of  its  maxims  with  uni- 
versal law :  this  constitutes  moral  necessity. 

The  question  then  naturally  arises,  Is  this  our  notion  of 
the  content  of  obligation,  that  a  rational  being  must  always 
will  according  to  universal  law?  ("Is  it  a  necessary  law 
for  all  rational  beings  that  they  should  always  judge  of 
their  actions  by  maxims  of  which  they  can  themselves 
will  that  they  should  serve  as  universal  laws?"2}  Two 
interpretations,  never  distinguished  by  Kant,  can  oe  given 
to  this  question.  For  him/duty  is  the  moral  law,  in  con- 
creto\  Now  the  fundamental  idea  of  a  law  is  that  it  shall 
always  command  the  same  thing.  But  command  different 
things-  is  precisely  what  duty  d6es  do ;  and  what  it  never 
entered  Kant's  head  to  allow  that  it  does.  If,  therefore,  we 
put  the  above  question  in  the  form,  Does  the  conception  of 
a  rational  being  involve  that  he  should  always  act  as  the 
sense  of  duty  directs?  we  may  answer  in  the  affirmative, 
universally,  without  binding  ourselves  always  to  will  the  same 
thing.  From  his  failure  to  see,  or  to  allow,  the  distinction 
just  pointed  out  between  law  and  duty,  Kant  bound  himself 
to  a  conception  of  goodness  at  which  common  sense  revolts, 
namely,  that  unchanging  consistency  is  the  only  fit  realiza- 
tion of  human  dignity.30 

If,  however,  it  is  a  law  for  all  rational  beings  that  they 
should  always  will  universally,  and  this  is  our  notion  of  obli- 
gation, then  "it  must  be  connected  (altogether  a  priori) 
with  the  very  conception  of  the  will  of  a  rational  being."31 


24  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [24 

In  short,  if  there  be  such  a  categorical  imperative  and  such 
responsibility  on  human  shoulders,  there  must  be  a  free  will. 
And  an  analysis  of  our  conception  of  a  rational  being  will 
show  that  we  view  his  will  as,  by  its  nature,  a  universal 
legislator. 

"The  will  is  conceived  as  a  faculty  of  determining  oneself 
to  action  in  accordance  with  the  conception  of  certain 
laws."  The  notion  of  it  implies  also  an  objective  ground  of 
the  determination  ;  that  is,  there  must  be  an  end  to  a  volition. 
If  the  law  is  to  be  universal,  the  end  must  also  be  able  to 
serve  as  an  object  for  all  rational  beings  without  exception ; 
in  other  words,  it  must  be  formal,  a  priori,  abstracted  from 
all  things  contingently  desirable  to  the  individual.  Such  an 
end  can  be  only  "  something  whose  existence  has  in  itself  an 
absolute  worth."33  This  absolute  goodness,  Kant  finds,  exists 
"  in  man  and  rational  beings  generally."  "  If  then  there  is 
a  categorical  imperative  it  must  be  such  that,  from  its  concep- 
tion, what  is  necessarily  an  end  for  every  one  (because  it  is 
an  end  in  itself)  constitutes  an  objective  principle  of  will,  and 
can  therefore  serve  as  an  universal  practical  law."34  In  short, 
the  categorical  imperative  must  be  stated  so  that  it  can  be 
seen  to  conserve  the  formal  end.  (Accordingly  the  practical 
imperative  will  be  as  follows :  So  act  as  to  treat  humanity 
whether  in  thine  own  person  or  in  that  of  any  other,  in  every 
case  as  an  end  withal,  never  as  a  means  only.3n  This  state- 
ment shows  the  first  marked  advance  in  Kant's  thought 
away  from  his  own  formalism.  For  whereas  the  categorical 
imperative,  as  first  stated,  paid  no  regard  to  anything  except 
the  volition  and  its  consistency  with  universal  law,  here  an 
end,  and  therefore  a  matter,  is  introduced  into  the  formula; 
to  which  end  the  rational  being  must  attend  in  testing  the 
morality  of  his  volitions.  Nevertheless  this  principle  is  not 
material  as  though  borrowed  from  experience :  in  this  re-  y 
spect  it  is  as  empty  a  concept  as  the  first  formula. 


25]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  E THICS  2 5 

These  two  formulae  (which  are  merely  the  objective  and 
subjective  sides  of  the  same  principle)  need  another  to  com- 
plete them;/  for  if  the  individual  must  make  himself  an  end, 
and  at  the  same  time  will  as  though  his  maxim  were  to  be- 
come universal  law,  there  must  be  a  harmony  between  these 
two  necessities.)  This  is  found  in  the  idea  of  the  will  of 
every  rational  being  as  a  universally  legislating  will;  which 
idea  alone  can  show  the  harmony  of  the  subjective  end  with 
universal  practical  reason,  and  is  therefore  the  only  proper 
conception  of  a  rational  being.  In  the  case  of  volition  from 
duty  all  interest  is  renounced,  and  it  is  this  fact  alone  that 
allows  us  to  conceive  of  the  will  as  universal  legislator: 
for  the  universality  of  the  law  deprives  its  legislator  of  any 
special  interest  in  it  arising  from  self-love  and  the  desire  to 
gratify  the  same.  It  follows  from  these  principles  that  while 
laws  of  duty  are  universal,  they  are  of  the  subject's  own 
giving:  this  is  the  supreme  ethical  principle  of  Autonomy) 
When  one  acts  from  interest  he  is  not  giving  laws  to  himself 
but  is  being  dictated  to  by  something  extraneous  to  his 
reason.  When  such  foreign  influence  is  absent,  the  princi- 
ple is  one  of  Autonomy. 

In  the  final  analysis  the  categorical  imperative  takes  on 
three  forms,  each  of  which  involves  the  other  two.  In  order 
to  be  sure  as  to  the  Tightness  of  his  volition,  it  is  convenient 
for  one  to  reduce  his  maxim  to  all  three  formulae,  and  thus 
put  it  to  three  tests.  The  difference  between  them  is  as 
follows :  The  first  is  the  form  of  a  maxim,  and  is  expressed 
thus: [Act  as  though  your  maxim  were  to  become  universal 
law.  The  second  is  the  matter :  Treat  humanity  as  an  end 
in  itself.  The  third  is  the  completion  (Bestimmung)  of 
these :  Art  as  though  your  will  were  the  universal  legisla- 
tive will.3^ 

By  the  foregoing  treatment  the  principles  of  Ethics  have 
been  reduced  to  three ;   of  which  the  first  alone,  Kant  thinks, 


26  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [26 

had  been  previously  discovered  :  ((i)  Man  is  subject  by  duty 
to  laws;  (2)  the  laws  are  all  ofnis  own  giving;  (3)  they 
are  universal. 37  The  elements  of  formal  ethics  as  we  gather 
them  from  these  three  principles  and  from  the  preceding 
discussion,  are  the  Gaod  Will,  Duty  as  the  ethical  form  of 
Law,  and  Autonomy.!  These  are  a  priori,  necessary  and 
universal,  and  ideal  or  formal  products  of  pure  reason. 

Kant  has  not  yet  proven  that  autonomy  exists,  or  that  a 
categorical  imperative  is  possible;  (this  requires  a  critique, 
being  an  analogue  to  the  question,  How  is  knowledge  possi- 
ble?). He  has  merely  endeavored  to  analyze  the  conception 
of  morality,  and  having  found  these  elements  existing  in  it 
a  priori,  now  asks  ad  hominem,  If  morality  has  any  reality, 
in  what  does  it  lie,  if  not  in  its  universality  and  a  priority?33 

This  completes  the  first  two  sections  of  the  Grundlegung. 
In  the  concluding  portion,  Kant  deals  with  the  conception  of 
Autonomy  or  Freedom  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  do  so 
in  order  to  prepare  the  mind  for  the  problem  of  the  Critique. 
Kant's  conception  of  Freedom  as  here  brought  out  is  that 
of  a  determination  of  the  will  by  reason  alone,  i.  e.  a  formal 
determination.  This  is  possible  only  through  the  power  of 
the  will  to  be  a  spontaneous  cause  independent  of  foreign 
determining  causes.  There  is  no  alternative  choice  how- 
ever: "the  unconditional  command  leaves  the  will  no  liberty 
to  choose  the  opposite."39  In  order  that  there  may  be 
formal  morality  at  all,  this  determination  of  the  will  by  a 
formal  principle  must  be  a  reality;  freedom  must  exist. 
Such  determination  by  the  form  of  the  law  is  the  condition 
also  on  which  one  may  regard  his  maxims  as  practical  uni- 
versal laws.40  In  short,  Kant  contends  that  the  will  is  not 
governed  by  physical  causation  (through  sensible  desires)  ; 
but  through  freedom,  by  reason.  This  is  accomplished  by 
noumenal  causality,  one  taking  effect  without  reference  to 
time-conditions.     The  apparent  contradiction  in  the  concep- 


2  7 ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  E  TIUCS  2  7 

tion  of  freedom  is  this :  that  as  noumenon  one  must  regard 
himself  as  lawgiver  through  the  spontaneity  of  his  will  as  a 
free  cause;  while  as  phenomenon  he  must  look  upon  himself 
as  subject  to  laws  of  natural  causation  and  of  morality.  As 
a  free  legislator  in  the  noumenal  world,  one's  acts  tend  to 
conform  to  the  autonomy  of  the  will ;  but  being  also  a  sensi- 
ble phenomenon,  it  becomes  possible  for  the  dictates  of 
reason  to  be  issued  as  an  imperative  "  ought."41 

Though  we  thus  assume  the  supersensible  world,  we  can 
think  it  as  to  its  formal  conditions  only : 42  for  noumenal 
causality  is  merely  an  empty  conception,  and  formal,  not  being 
based  on  sensible  intuition.  Nevertheless,  every  being  that 
cannot  act,  except  under  the  idea  of  such  causality  (freedom), 
is  just  for  that  reason  in  a  practical  point  of  view  really  free.43 
The  objective  reality  of  freedom  is  shown  in  intentions."^ 
The  formal  condition  of  the  determination  of  k  free  will  by 
reason  alone  is  Autonomy.45  But  to  explain  how  this  de- 
termination is  possible,  how  a  mere  formal  principle  (the 
moral  law)  can  of  itself  supply  a  spring  without  a  matter  (a 
sensible  impulse  or  an  end  to  be  attained)  is  beyond  human 
reason.46  For  pure  reason  contains  as  its  matter  knowledge 
of  objects,  and  as  form  the  practical  law  of  the  universal 
validity  of  its  maxims.  If  knowledge  be  abstracted  from  the 
reason,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  anything  left  which 
can  serve  as  spring :  yet  this  is  what  formal  morality  de- 
mands of  us  to  accept.47 

With  the  Idea  of  Freedom  ends  the  analysis :  it  has 
shown  that  the  conditions  of  morality  are  a  Good  Will, 
which  secures  morality  to  itself  by  the  obedience  of  its 
maxims  to  Duty,  conceives  by  reason  its  maxims  as  Univer- 
sal Laws,  and  effects  its  ends  through  Freedom.  The  prob- 
lem is  to  establish  freedom  as  a  reality:  this  is  the  work  of 
the  Critique. 

1  Abbott,  p.  9.  2  Ibid.,  p.  63.  s  Ibid.,  p.  206. 


28  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [28 

*  Abbott,  p.  12.  5  Ibid.,  p.  10. 

6  It  may  well  be  asked  if  this  can  mean  anything  else  than  that  the  will  is  ab- 
solute good  because  it  produces,  and  is  necessary  to  good  results.  Kant  would 
reply  that,  in  any  case,  humanity  has  a  worth  which  not  only  makes  its  good 
volition  necessary  to  good  results,  but  marks  itself  out  as  the  only  truly  good 
object. 

7  Abbott,  p.  io.  Here,  however,  it  is  the  goodness  of  the  will  that  is  said  to 
be  more  than  a  wish. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  29.  9  Ibid.,  p.  268.  10  Ibid.,  p.  13. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  296.  "  Ibid.,  p.  256.  13  Ibid.,  p.  327. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  16.  15  Ibid.,  p.  278.  16  Ibid.,  p.  279. 

17  Ibid.,  p.  299.  18  Ibid.,  p.  299.  19  Ibid.,  p.  283. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  282.  «  Ibid.,  p.  122.  n  Ibid,  p.  169. 

23  Ibid.,  p.  168.  "  Ibid.,  p.  33.  » Ibid.,  p.  34. 

*Ubid.,  p.  35.  *  Ibid.,  p.  38.  »  /K*,  p.  38. 

29  /&</.,  p.  44. 

30  There  is  one  place  where  the  distinction  is  made,  perhaps  unconsciously,  at 
any  rate  at  the  expense  of  what  we  may  call  legal  (or  logical)  formalism.  This 
in  the  Remark,  p.  115  of  Abbott :  here  universality  (logical  form)  is  not  the  test 
of  Tightness,  but  this  office  is  performed  by  the  sense  of  duty,  or  conscientious- 
ness, as  distinct  from  mere  universality.  It  is  a  hint  of  the  difference  between 
Law  and  Duty  that  impels  Kant  to  distinguish  between  civil  duties  and  those  of 
virtue  in  the  Metaphysic  of  Ethics. 

3'  Abbott,  p.  14-  «  Ibid.,  p.  45.  33  Ibid.,  p.  46. 

84  Ibid.,  p.  47;  the  translation  being  somewhat  altered. 

3bIbid.,  p.  47.  ™Ibid.,  p.  54.  ^Ibid.,  p.  51.  ™Ibid.,  p.  64. 

39  Ibid.,  p.  37.  This  refers  only  to  the  power  to  choose  another  command  (if 
one  wishes  to  be  moral) ;  it  says  nothing  of  power  to  choose  either  one  of  two 
courses. 

40  Ibid.,  p.  1 14.  41  Ibid.,  p.  73.  42  Ibid.,  p.  79. 
43  Ibid.,  p.  67.  44  Ibid.,  p.  146.  45  Ibid.,  p.  81. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  81.                        "Ibid^p.  82. 


III. 

THE   CRITIQUE   OF  PRACTICAL   REASON. 

THE  purpose  and  plan  of  this  work  differ  fundamentally 
from  those  of  the  Grundlegung.  The  latter  is  the  analysis 
of  the  conceptions  inevitably  contained  in  morality  as  Kant 
conceived  it  to  be  found  in  "popular  moral  philosophy;" 
this  is  to  prove  or  disprove  the  real  existence  of  morality 
by  proving  or  disproving  the  reality  of  freedom. 

In  thus  dealing  with  freedom  we  do  more  than  establish 
morality ;  we  give  reality  also  to  a  rational  idea,  freedom,  in 
the  category  of  causality.  In  so  doing  we  give  objective 
reality  also  to  all  the  other  categories,  but  only  so  far  as  they 
stand  in  necessary  connection  with  the  moral  law.1  The 
Critique,  therefore,  besides  being  a  contribution  toEthics,  is 
a  continuation  of  the  epistemology  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason.  Knowledge,  which  in  that  work  had  been  confined 
to  phenomena,  is  here  (as  certitude)  extended  to  the  super- 
sensible in  so  far  as  its  formal  conditions  are  concerned. 
In  this  work  also  reality  is  given  to  the  ideas  of  God  and 
immortality  as  conditions  of  the  application  of  the  will  to 
its  a  priori  object. 

The  faculty  by  which  reality  is  given  to  these  supersensi- 
ble ideas  is  the  will,  or  practical  reason,  "  a  faculty  either  to 
produce  objects  corresponding  to  ideas,  or  to  determine  our- 
selves to  the  effecting  of  such  objects." 2 

It  is  much  more  difficult  to  understand  the  movement  of 
Kant's  thought  in  the  Critique  than  in  the  Grundlegung.  In 
the  latter,  certain  preliminary  difficulties  being  overcome,  it 
29]  29 


-O  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  V 30 

is  not  bard  to  see  through  the  gradations  of  the  three  sec- 
tions and  the  way  in  which  the  empty  concepts  are  devel- 
oped one  from  the  other  till  "  morality  is  finally  reduced  to 
the  idea  of  freedom."  In  the  Critique,  however,  Kant's  his- 
torical position  must  be  remembered ;  as  in  the  first 
Critique,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Kant  was  a  pupil  of 
Leibnitzian  Rationalism,  forced  to  face  the  difficulties  offered 
by  British  empiricism.  His  "will"  is  a  rational  will,  not  a 
development  from  the  feelings.  Reason  is  the  highest  faculty 
of  man,  and  as  such  and  on  account  of  the  rebellious  nature 
of  the  passionate  desires,  has  a  right  to  dictate  to  the  in- 
clinations. On  the  other  hand  he  denies  most  emphatically 
the  theses  of  the  most  worthy  (from  his  point  of  view)  of  the 
Empirical  Schools,  namely,  the  advocates  of  the  "moral 
sense."  These  were  in  brief  the  assertion,  of  the  existence 
of  an  innate  sensory  faculty  inclining  man  to  a  love  of  the 
good,  without  regard  to  his  own  advantage ;  that  this  faculty 
is  independent  of  the  will,  and  that  man  is  naturally  good. 
These  positions  Kant  has  in  mind  all  through  the  Critique; 
their  psychological  foundation  is  discussed  and  somewhat  is 
conceded  to  them  in  the  chapter  on  "Motives;"  and  he 
specifically  denies  them  in  the  four  Theorems  and  the  Prob- 
lems and  Remarks,  with  which  the  Analytic  opens. 

The  most  important  fact  to  be  observed  is  the  relation  of 
Kant's  Ethics  to  his  Epistemology.  In  Ethics  he  does  not 
occupy  the  critical  standpoint  at  all.  So  far  as  the  suprem- 
acy of  Reason  is  concerned,  he  is  still  a  faithful  Wolffian. 
As  Hume  did  not  find  an  intuitional  ethics  inconsistent 
with  an  empirical  psychology,  so  Kant  does  not  find  a 
rationalistic  ethics  inconsistent  with  the  middle  standpoint 
of  his  theory  of  knowledge.  Besides  the  use  of  the  two  fac- 
ulties (Sensibility  and  Understanding)  as  sources  of  knowl- 
edge, of  which  he  had  said  that  "  neither  of  them  is  to  be 
regarded   as  superior  to  the  other,"  he  now  finds  another 


3  i  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  3  x 

use  for  the  second,  namely,  that  of  producing  concepts 
whose  emptiness  is  no  discredit  to  them.  Nay,  they  lose  all 
efficiency,  all  worth,  if  they  be  in  any  degree  mixed  with  the 
matter  of  sense-perception.  That  supremacy  of  the  reason 
which  he  specifically  rejects  in  the  formation  of  constitutive 
knowledge,  he  brings  back — strengthened  by  its  isolation — 
in  the  regulative  science  of  Ethics.  In  this  science,  there- 
fore, he  remains  a  true  Wolffian. 

In  the  Critique  the  terms  Form  and  Matter  are  more 
markedly  developed  into  the  peculiarly  Kantian  use  of  them. 
That  is,  it  is  the  fact  that  it  is  an  a  priori  product  of  pure 
reason  rather  than  its  universality  that  marks  the  form. 
Perhaps  this  is  the  result  of  the  strong  emphasis  given  to 
the  notion  of  matter  as  the  given  in  sensation.  This  how- 
ever is  only  matter  as  it  is  presented  in  intuition  to  the 
faculty  of  desire.  But  Kant  limited  the  name  material  to 
the  practical  principles  which  presuppose  the  object  of  de- 
sire as  the  ground  of  determination  of  the  will,  and  thereby 
showed  that  his  ordinary  conception  of  matter  was  of  the 
sense-given.  Nevertheless,  just  as  readily  might  the  name 
of  material  have  been  bestowed  on  any  theory  which  pre- 
supposed an  object,  whether  of  desire,  or  of  will,  or  any 
other  faculty,  as  the  ground  of  determination  of  the  will. 

To  escape  this  possibility,  and  to  limit  the  name  material 
to  sensationalistic  theories,  Kant  asserts  that  in  a  theory  of 
pure  autonomy  the  concept  of  the  good  (the  matter)  is 
evolved  only  after  the  law  has  issued ;  he  wished  thereby 
also  to  escape  controversy  as  to  whether  the  will  had  been 
determined  by  the  law  or  by  the  idea  of  the  good  (i.  e.t 
formally  or  materially).  In  this  difficulty  Kant  does  not 
avail  himself  of  the  escape  provided  him  by  his  argument  in 
the  Grundlegung.  His  position  is  this :  he  has  declared  all 
material  practical  principles  to  be,  ipso  facto,  contrary  to 
morality.      But   a   rational   being   would   destroy    his   own 


32  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  ["32 

rationality  to  act  without  a  purpose,  an  object,  in  view;  to 
have  such  a  purpose  is  to  act  on  a  material  principle. 
Kant  escapes  by  asserting  that  in  a  moral  act  the  law  must 
determine  the  will  before  the  object,  whether  one  of  desire 
or  not,  be  presented  ;  he  thus  secures  in  theory  a  formal 
determination.  What  he  might  have  done  was  to  have  de- 
clared the  Good  and  the  Law  to  be  absolutely  identical. 
This  course  was  open  to  him  from  his  argument  in  the 
Grundlegung,  where  his  second  formula  of  the  categorical 
imperative  in  effect  was  an  affirmation  of  the  fact  that  one 
may  will  morally  and  at  the  same  time  will  an  end. 

I  have  said  that  when  Kant  speaks  of  "  matter,"  his  usual 
thought  is  of  the  sense-given.  This  came  naturally,  and 
particularly  because  the  given  in  sensation  must  always  be 
particular  and  contingent;  and  on  that  account  this  notion 
of  matter  is  closest  allied  to  the  Aristotelian  conception  with 
which  Kant  was  unconsciously  trying  to  keep  in  touch.  For 
though  the  Summum  Bonum  or  any  other  object  of  the 
will,  because  it  is  an  object,  is  material;  yet  it  exists  only 
as  an  unrealized  idea,  a  general  term  without  content ;  and 
hence  is  removed  from  the  traditional  notion  of  matter. 
This  very  fact,  however,  that  the  Summum  Bonum  is  a 
matter,  is  a  sufficient  refutation  of  Kant's  second  Theorem  in 
the  Critique,  viz.,  that  all  material  practical  principles  as 
such  are  of  one  and  the  same  kind,  and  come  under  the 
general  head  of  self-love  or  private  happiness.  Because  it  is 
only  by  a  departure  from  his  own  use  of  the  terms  that  a 
universal  end,  as  the  Summum  Bonum  is,  can  be  so  classi- 
fied ;  nor  in  this  case  could  the  realization  of  the  Good  be 
commanded  as  a  duty. 

The  difference  between  Kant's  and  the  traditional  concep- 
tion of  form  and  matter  is  further  seen  in  this  confusion  of 
the  summum  bonum  as  both  formal  and  material.  In  the 
latter  conception  it  is  formal  only.     Kant  was  not  primarily 


33]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  33 

seeking  the  universal  law,  but  what  in  his  opinion  is  identi- 
cal therewith,  namely,  the  absolute.  It  was  not  a  universal 
Thou  shalt  that  he  sought,  but  an  unconditional  THOU  shalt 
addressed  to  each  individual.  The  maxim  of  the  will  must 
unconditionally  be  conformed  to  a  universal  law.  He  re- 
garded this  as  the  necessity  demanded  by  the  law,  and  ac- 
cordingly looked  on  universality  and  absoluteness  as  the 
same.  Except  in  an  ideally  good  society,  a  universal  and 
an  unconditional  command  will  coincide  only  under  one 
condition,  that  the  circumstances  be  exactly  the  same  in  two 
or  more  given  instances.  As  this  never  occurs,  it  would 
practically  destroy  the  universality  of  an  absolute  command 
to  recognize  such  a  condition  as  legitimate.  Kant  might 
have  granted  it,  however,  without  disadvantage,  had  he  not 
consecrated  certain  particular  commands  as  universals ;  thus 
confounding  the  material  with  the  formal. 

At  the  present  time,  when  so  much  stress  is  laid  upon 
mitigating  circumstances,  probably  no  one  will  uphold  that 
for  a  law  to  be  unconditionally  binding  on  one,  it  must  at  all 
times  and  in  all  places  be  binding  on  all  others  who  are  sub- 
ject to  the  idea  of  Law.  That  it  is  an  absolute  and  also 
universal  law  for  all  rational  beings  to  do  their  duty  is  a  cer- 
tainty ;  but  this  does  not  involve  the  alternative  that  specific 
acts  are  always  duties  or  else  not  at  all.  Taking  this  sup- 
posed identity  of  universality  and  absoluteness  as  a  fact, 
Kant  puts  it  to  practical  use  by  making  the  former  the  test 
of  the  latter.  He  does  this  by  asking  what  the  result  will  be 
should  one  act  according  to  a  certain  precept.  The  out- 
come of  an  act  is  not  intended  thereby  to  be  the  ground  of 
the  duty;  and  yet  one  inevitably  feels  that  the  result  is  more 
than  a  mere  test  of  the  Tightness  of  an  act ;  but  for  it  to  be 
more  is  the  destruction  of  the  unconditionality  of  the  given 
duty. 

Kant  asserts  that  empirical  principles  will  contradict  each 


34  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [34 

other.  Apparently  it  never  occurs  to  him  to  ask  whether 
the  same  be  true  concerning  universal  maxims.  The  ques- 
tion is  not,  however,  as  argued  by  some,  whether  universal 
maxims  willed  unconditionally  will  conflict.  The  problem 
is  the  deeper  one  of  the  superior  importance  of  different 
bases  for  duties ;  one  ground  being  upheld  by  some,  another 
by  others.  Kant's  thesis  is  that  the  rational  being's  first 
duty  as  regards  ends  is  to  himself.  This  he  owes  to  himself 
as  a  rational  being;  and  it  having  been  seen  to,  virtue  will 
follow  as  its  own  reward.  In  all  circumstances  (universally), 
and  at  any  price  (unconditionally),  man  is  to  protect  the 
humanity  represented  in  himself,  for  "  morality,  and  human- 
ity as  capable  of  it,  alone  has  worth."  No  supposed  duties 
to  others,  even  though  also  based  on  the  dignity  of  human 
nature,  can  transcend  this  primary  duty  or  even  conflict  with 
it;  for  social  duties  or  duties  to  others  generally  are  condi- 
tional on  that  owed  to  self.  "  No  good  can  come  to  man  but 
through  himself.  Likewise,  no  harm  can  come  to  him  but 
through  himself.  By  no  possible  chance  can  aught  befall  a 
man  that  hath  not  its  origin  or  cause  within  the  individual 
himself.  All  which  he  experiences  is  for  his  good.  When  he 
learns  this  he  will  then  no  more  shun  penalty,  pain  and  death, 
so-called."  These  are  sentiments  moving  one  naturally  to 
the  position  which  Kant  is  expressing  in  so  formal  a  manner. 
In  the  case,,  for  example,  of  our  duty  to  speak  the  truth 
(or  the  opposite,  as  it  may  be)  to  a  murderer  who  asks  us 
whether  our  friend,  of  whom  he  is  in  pursuit,  has  taken 
refuge  in  our  house;3  the  question  at  issue  is  whether  the 
ordinary  duty  to  self,  and  to  the  humanity  represented  in 
our  person,  is  of  greater  or  less  obligation  than  the  duty  to 
preserve  a  fellow-being's  life.  From  the  Stoic  standpoint 
the  question  is  easily  answered:  the  former  duty  is  uncon- 
ditional, and  to  be  although  indirectly  the  cause  of  another's 
v  death  is  not  so  bad  as  to  violate  the  absolute  duty  to  uphold 


UNIVERSITY 


35]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  E  THICS  3  5 

the  dignity  of  a  man.  And  how  is  death  an  evil?  "  Anytus 
and  Melitus  are  able  indeed  to  kill  me,  but  they  cannot 
harm  me." 

There  is  an  alternative  in  the  case  of  veracity  which 
strangely  is  not  often  discussed.  It  is  taken  for  granted 
that  one  must  answer,  yes  or  no,  when  such  a  question  as 
that  just  discussed  is  put  to  him.  But  why  answer  at  all? 
If  one  will  keep  silence,  there  is  nothing  to  make  him  speak. 
In  that  case  neither  an  extreme  regard  for  a  formal  law  will 
lead  one  to  harm  the  guiltless  even  indirectly;  nor  will  his 
duty  to  himself  be  violated  by  a  departure  from  truth.  But 
that,  it  is  objected,  endangers  one's  own  life.  What  of  that? 
"Is  not  to  die  better  than  to  lead  an  evil  life?"4  And  it  is 
observable  that  men's  liking  is  more  toward  a  dead  hero 
than  a  living  coward.  This  alternative  merely  changes  the 
venue,  so  to  speak;  it  does  not  affect  the  question  of  the 
unconditional  nature  of  the  duty  to  veracity. 

The  general  standpoint  of  moralists  of  Kant's  type  is  that 
of  the  second  statement  of  the  categorical  imperative,  that 
humanity  in  one's  own  person  and  in  that  of  every  other  is 
to  be  treated  as  an  end  in  itself.  Beginning  with  the  opin- 
ion that  goodness  resides  in  the  will,  and  that  things  beyond 
control  are  ethically  indifferent,  it  is  but  a  step,  an  imper- 
ceptible one  often,  to  the  conception  of  humanity  as  an  end 
in  itself.  Inevitably,  however,  one  in  this  position  comes 
to  regard  certain  actions  as  the  embodiment  of  the  absolute 
virtue  which  it  is  duty  to  attain.  There  is  no  more  logical 
justification  for  it  than  for  the  opposite,  and  yet  as  a  fact, 
those  who  have  asserted  the  singular  goodness  of  the  wiW 
have  likewise  held  to  the  universal  validity  of  certain  pre- 
cepts. One  would  think  that  the  very  idea  of  a  will  would 
lead  to  the  opposite  conception ;  that  is,  to  the  opinion  that 
if  one  is  conciously  acting  from  regard  to  humanity  he  may 
reverse  the  maxim  of  his  will  whenever  the  good  of  human- 


36  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [36 

ity  seems  to  call  for  it.  For  if  the  law  is  to  be  obeyed  for 
its  own  sake,  though  to  be  sure  the  Good  Will  is  necessary 
at  every  step,  the  goodness  of  the  will  is,  notwithstanding,  of 
secondary  value,  being  good  only  as  a  means  to  the  attain- 
ment of  consistency;  the  man  is  regarded  as  made  for  the 
law,  not  the  law  for  the  man. 

The  position  I  wish  now  to  state — which  puts  man  above 
the  law — holds  that  even  in  such  a  case  as  lying,  whose 
interdiction  is  undoubtedly  conceived  commonly  as  im- 
planted, one  is  not  to  judge  by  the  consistency  or  incon- 
sistency with  the  law,  but  as  to  the  probability  whether 
Good  Will  may  not  have  prompted  the  departure  from  truth. 
For  if  Good  Will  has  prompted  it,  the  law  has  been  fulfilled, 
without  regard  to  the  fact  that  there  may  be  an  incon- 
sistence with  a  previous  maxim.  Suppose  a  person  finds  a 
trusted  friend  has  deceived  him :  is  it  a  higher  principle  to 
judge  by  the  mere  law,  or  to  take  into  consideration  that, 
on  account  of  the  previously  known  character  of  the  de- 
ceiver, more  than  likely  the  deception  is  meant  for  the  ulti- 
mate good  of  the  one  deceived?  Is  not  the  latter  mode  a 
greater  exaltation  of  the  Good  Will?  does  it  not  put  a 
higher  value  on  man  as  an  end  than  that  which  would  sacri- 
fice him  to  a  formula?  From  this  point  of  view,  therefore, 
it  is  affirmed  that  to  trust  a  friend,  to  put  faith  in  man,  and 
thereby  to  show  a  good  will,  is  of  greater  praise  than  to  uphold 
consistency  with  a  law  to  the  condemnation  of  good  i?itentions. 

Stoicism,  however,  has  never  taken  this  position,  but  has 
chosen  to  consider  the  goodness  of  the  will  as  lying  in  con- 
sistency. The  Self  loses  its  primary  importance ;  from  life 
is  taken  its  sacredness,  and  in  place  of  a  principle  we 
have  a  formula.  For  the  preservation  of  this  formula,  life 
itself  is  to  be  sacrificed ;  and  the  world  agrees  in  its  admira- 
tion of  such  sacrifice.  For  the  grandeur  of  Stoicism,  and  the 
reason  for  its  tendency  to  formalize,  may  be  explained  from 


37]  ELEMEN TS  OF  KANT'S  E THICS  3 y 

this  very  belief,  that  simply  because  a  man  is  worth  so  much, 
he  should  strive  to  attain  to  perfect  agreement  with  the  dicta 
of  Duty.  Consistency,  the  manifestation  of  Duty  the  most 
difficult,  is  mistaken  for  the  thing  itself,  and  whenever  a  Stoic 
speaks  of  the  law  he  means  the  formula,  the  shell,  of  the  law.5 

This  position  is  avowedly  Kant's  at  the  very  start;  when, 
therefore,  he  brings  in  the  conception  of  the  end,  it  is  by  a 
reversal  of  the  road  taken  by  the  Stoic — for  the  Greek  the  end 
was  everything.  Each,  however,  finally  arrived  at  a  postu- 
lation  of  actions  as  good  in  themselves,  which  we  shall  find 
Kant  doing  in  his  treatment  of  the  summum  bonum.  His 
primary  position  had  been  that  the  Good  Will  is  the  highest 
good,  and  this  he  now  affirms  of  Virtue  as  an  element  of 
the  summum  bonum.  But  there  is  nothing  in  his  later  expo- 
sition to  denote  that  the  possession  of  a  Good  Will  and 
Virtue  were  identified  in  his  thought;  that  is  to  say,  in  the 
time  between  the  two  expositions  Virtue  had  gravitated  from 
the  position  of  a  quality  of  mind  to  one  of  action.  In  this 
frame  of  mind  the  doing  of  certain  actions  and  the  not  doing 
of  others  become  the  objects  of  unconditional  commands ; 
life,  regarded  as  sacred  more  strongly  by  modern  Ethics 
than  by  any  other,  becomes  ethically  indifferent ;  and  in  con- 
trast with  it,  it  becomes  impossible  to  argue  for  the  occa- 
sional rightfulness  of  lying,  stealing,  killing,  unchastity,  or  to 
make  the  opposite  duties  conflict. 

The  Individual  being  the  highest  end,  consistency  with  self 
as  this  end  becomes  paramount  duty.  It  is  impossible,  how- 
ever, to  find  anything  in  an  empty  a  priori  form  with  which 
to  be  consistent.  We  can,  nevertheless,  calculate  the  effect 
if  every  one  did  either  of  two  contrary  acts ;  that  one  is  right 
which  will  best  promote  the  Ideal  Society,  the  Kingdom  of 
Ends,  as  that  best  promotes  the  ideal  man  ;  that  is,  "  morality 
consists  in  the  reference  of  all  action  to  the  legislation  which 
alone  can  render  a  kingdom  of  ends  possible! '6     For  a  test  of 


38  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [38 

duty,  therefore,  Kant  is  compelled  to  leave  the  form  of  the 
law,  but  yet  finds  it  in  the  realm  of  the  a  priori  and  uncon- 
ditioned ;  for  the  kingdom  of  ends  is  altogether  an  Idea  of 
pure  reason. 

On  the  above  principle  one  may  will  as  he  pleases ;  it  will 
soon  become  apparent  that  certain  volitions  can  be  willed 
ethically  while  others  (also  universals)  cannot.  In  short, 
universality  is  not  a  test  of  Tightness,  and  the  form  of  the 
law  must  be  abandoned  for  the  form  (sense)  of  duty.  This 
conclusion  is  fully  elucidated  by  Kant  himself  in  the  third 
Theorem  and  the  appended  Remark,  but  he  conceals  from 
himself  by  phraseology  an  outcome  which  destroys  one  of 
his  most  important  though  not  fundamental  doctrines,  the 
necessity  for  outward  consistency. 

The  Analytic  of  Pure  Practical  Reason 

The  first  part  of  the  Critique  merely  reiterates  the  position 
of  the  Grundlegung,  that  all  material  principles  are  empirical, 
hence  can  furnish  only  maxims  of  advice,  not  universal  laws  ; 
that  such  principles  place  the  determining  principle  of  the 
will  in  the  lower  desires,  and  in  demanding  a  material  end 
(the  satisfaction  of  those  desires)  place  themselves  under  the 
head  of  self-love.  Contrariwise,  the  opinion  is  reasserted 
that  a  maxim  can  be  a  law  and  moral  only  when  it  determines 
the  will  by  its  form. 

Ethics  in  Kant's  conception  is  necessarily  a  science  of 
Laws;  it  must  command,  and  that  it  may  do  so  must  be 
based  on  the  sense  of  duty.  Ethics  cannot  merely  state 
what  ends  are  worthy  of  attainment,  then  describe  the  means 
to  their  accomplishment  and  dub  such  description  a  "law." 
There  must  be  a  command;  and  in  the  phrase  "  determina- 
tion by  the  form  of  the  law"  we  must,  to  understand  its  full 
significance,  put  the  weight  of  emphasis  on  law  with  all  that 
the  word  can  imply.     The  reason   for  this  is  found   in  his 


OF  TMg 

UNlVEHSfTY 


39]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  39 

conception  of  the  relation  of  Reason  and  Desire.  Duty  is 
not  simply  what  one  ought  to  do — he  sometimes  loses  sight 
of  this  essential — but  is  also  what  one  does  not  desire  to  do. 
Except  in  his  treatment  of  the  summum  bonum  Kant  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  able  to  conceive  of  a  duty  being  desir- 
able, and  the  realization  of  that  element  of  the  summum 
bonum  which  is  desirable  he  afterwards  denies  to  be  a  duty. 
An  Ethics  which  does  not  contain  as  its  chief  element  (and 
this  is  the  characteristic  of  all  hedonistic  systems)  the  fact 
of  law,  of  a  law  commanding  by  the  idea  of  law  (the  sense 
of  duty)  is  no  Ethics  at  all. 

The  law  of  which  Ethics  treats,  we  have  already  learned, 
to  be  a  law  of  pure  practical  reason  must  be  necessary, 
universal  and  unconditioned.  Such  a  law  can  proceed  only 
from  pure  reason  a  priori,  and  can  be  nothing  but  the  con- 
cept of  a  law.  It  governs  by  an  ill-  defined  feeling  of 
oughtness. 

These  requirements  being  regarded  as  postulates  not 
needing  proof,  Theorem  I.  proceeds  from  them  to  assert 
that  all  practical  principles  which  presuppose  an  object 
(matter)  of  the  faculty  of  desire  as  the  ground  of  determina- 
tion of  the  will  are  empirical  and  can  furnish  no  practical 
laws.7  For  such  principles  cannot  be  based  on  the  idea  of 
a  law,  inasmuch  as  they  presuppose  an  object  of  sensible 
intuition ;   nor  can  they  be  universal  and  unconditioned. 

An  object  of  sensible  intuition,  pre-supposed  as  deter- 
minant of  the  will,  can  bear  no  relation  to  the  subject  except 
through  a  feeling  of  pleasure  in  the  realization  of  the  object. 
As  a  result  we  have  Theorem  II.,  that  all  material  practical 
principles  as  such  are  of  one  and  the  same  kind,, and  come 
under  the  general  principle  of  self-love  or  private  happiness.8 
In  doing  so  they  violate  all  the  conditions  of  a  law  except 
that  of  necessity,  and  this  necessity  is  not  one  of  reason  (and 
consequently  not  formal),  but  a  material  necessity  of  sensible 


40  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  VaQ 

nature.  In  this  theorem  Kant  definitely  limits  the  name 
material  to  theories  and  principles  which  pre-suppose  an  ob- 
ject of  the  faculty  of  desire.  Properly  he  had  no  right  to 
do  this,  as  any  principle  which  pre-supposes  an  object  is 
material,  without  regard  to  the  faculty  of  which  it  is  an 
object. 

It  follows  from  Theorem  I.  that  material  practical  princi- 
ples being  unable  to  furnish  ethical  laws,  a  rational  being 
cannot  regard  his  maxims  as  universal  laws  unless  he  con- 
ceives them  as  principles  which  determine  the  will  not  by 
their  matter,  but  by  their  form  only  (Theorem  III.).9  For 
only  a  form  can  proceed  a  priori  from  pure  reason,  and  only 
a  concept  thought  a  priori  can  serve  as  an  unconditioned 
and  universal  law.  Kant's  proof  of  Theorem  III.  is  thus 
stated :  The  matter  is  the  object  of  the  will.  Either  this  is 
the  determining  ground  of  the  will  or  it  is  not.  In  the 
former  case,  the  rule  of  the  will  cannot  be  a  law,  as  it  would 
be  empirical  (Theorem  I.).  If  the  matter  be  subtracted, 
there  is  nothing  left  but  the  bare  form,  the  idea,  of  a  law. 
Hence  either  one  cannot  regard  his  maxims  as  laws  at  all,  or 
he  must  conceive  them  as  such  by  virtue  of  their  form  only. 
Kant  immediately  subjoins  in  a  remark,  however,  that  not 
every  form  of  maxim  is  fit  to  serve  as  a  law.  He  proceeds 
to  show  that  the  desire  for  happiness  is  universal,  but  is  not 
on  that  account  a  universal  law.  This  specific  case  may  be 
explained  on  other  grounds,  but  notwithstanding,  it  remains 
true  that  Kant  shows  conclusively  that  a  formal  maxim  is  not 
necessarily  a  universal  law. 

This  position  of  Kant's,  that  a  formal  maxim  is  not  e.)  ipso 
a  universal  law,  is  capable  of  two  interpretations.  He  may 
have  here  seen  that  a  maxim  may  have  the  form  of  a  law 
without  conveying  the  idea  of  a  law ;  in  other  words,  that 
a  mandate  having  all  the  formal  appearance  of  a  law  may  be 
directed  to  a  person  without  his  being  in  the  least  impelled 


4i ]  ELEMENTS  OT  KANT'S  ETHICS  4I 

by  a  sense  of  duty  (the  idea  of  law)  to  obey  the  command. 
Or,  in  the  second  place  (what  is  really  the  same  thing),  he 
may  have  had  an  inkling  of  the  distinction  before  made  be- 
tween Law  and  Duty,  that  the  former  commands  the  same 
thing  always,  the  latter  need  not.  In  either  case  it  is  shown 
that  to  universalize  a  maxim  is  not  thereby  to  make  it  moral. 

If  the  law  must  be  the  a  priori  product  of  the  reason,  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  it  as  given  (commanded)  to  any  one 
except  the  being  from  whom  it  proceeds,  for  it  cannot  be  re- 
garded in  its  pure  state,  and  its  necessity  would  be  disproven, 
did  one  have  to  wait  till  the  law  be  given  him.  In  short, 
from  the  requirement  that  the  law  be  a  priori y  the  Autonomy 
of  the  will  follows  as  a  matter  of  course  (Theorem  IV.).10 

Following  the  d  priority  of  the  law,  the  sole  principle  of 
morality  must  "  consist  in  the  independence  on  all  matter  of 
the  law  (namely,  a  desired  object),  and  in  the  determination 
of  the  elective  will  by  the  mere  universal  legislative  form 
[idea]  of  which  its  maxim  must  be  capable."  This  gives  us 
a  negative  and  a  positive  view  of  the  same  fact  of  freedom  : 
the  former  being  the  independence  on  the  matter  of  the 
law ;  the  latter,  the  self-legislation  of  a  being  by  pure  prac- 
tical reason.  Nevertheless,  the  matter  of  the  law  need  not 
be  expunged  (even  were  it  possible)  in  order  to  obtain 
autonomy :  only  the  matter  must  not  be  present  as  the  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  the  law.  Every  volition  must  have 
an  object ;  but  this  is  not  necessarily  the  determining  prin- 
ciple of  the  will.  Thus,  one  may  will  the  happiness  of  others, 
but  only  on  condition  he  will  it  as  a  universal,  and  not  for 
the  sake  of  the  happiness.11 

If  the  principle  of  morality  maintained  by  Kant  is  one  of 
a  priori  Autonomy,  and  we  grant  that  reason  can  give  rise 
to  but  one  a  priori  principle,  all  other  theories  may  be 
grouped  as  heteronomous.12  It  does  not  follow,  however, 
that  all  other  theories  are  material  and  seek  the  satisfaction  of 


42  THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  TERIAL  [42 

the  inclinations.  The  Moral  Sense  theory,  for  instance,  had 
as  its  chief  characteristic  that  it  asserted  the  existence  of  a 
sense  whose  only  object  was  to  determine  one  to  action 
immediately  without  reference  to  personal  advantage  of  any 
sort.  It  was  thus  as  strong  a  protest  against  Egoistic 
Hedonism  as  Kantianism  itself.  According  to  Hutcheson, 
self-interest  cannot  be  the  sole  moral  motive ;  it  can  merely 
be  added  to  the  motive  to  give  zest  to  the  pursuit  of  virtue.13 
Moral  Sense,  he  says,  is  the  power  of  receiving  "other  per- 
ceptions of  moral  actions  than  those  of  advantage."  u  "  The 
virtuous  agent  is  never  apprehended  by  us  as  acting  only 
from  views  of  his  own  interest,  but  as  principally  influenced 
by  some  other  motive."15  Wherein  the  Moral  Sense  theory 
is  heteronomous,  according  to  Kantian  principles,  is  in 
placing  its  fundamental  principle  in  sensibility  instead  of 
the  reason.  Indeed,  the  moral  sense  is  similar  to  "  Re- 
spect" in  Kant's  system  in  many  respects  (not  the  least  of 
which  is  that  they  are  both  independent  of  the  will)  ;  Kant 
himself  makes  the  comparison. 

In  the  case  also  of  the  "  Will  of  God  "  theory,  it  is  not  a 
desired  object  that  determines  the  will ;  and  it  also  is  not 
material.  For  religious  teachers,  Hebrew  and  Christian, 
have  constantly  maintained  that  the  law  is  not  fulfilled  when 
executed  for  some  object  beyond  the  mere  law,  or  the  will 
of  God  conceived  as  law.  Its  heteronomy  must  be  sought 
therefore  in  another  principle :  this  is  the  fact  that  while  the 
law  is  a  pure  moral  mandate,  yet  it  is  not  possible  to  be 
willed  a  priori  by  the  rational  being  himself ;  since  its  very 
conception  is  that  it  is  given  from  without. 

In  both  these  cases  it  is  quite  possible  that,  if  an  adherent 
of  one  of  them  were  asked  wherefore  he  acted  as  he  did,  he 
could  give  no  other  reason  than,  for  the  pleasure  he  expected 
therefrom  (save  that  in  the  Moral  Sense  theory  the  will  is 
not  free,  and  there  can  of  course  be  no  "  wherefore  ").     But 


43]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  43 

the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  two  systems  is  that 
they  never  (till  Paley's  time,  perhaps)  asked  themselves 
this  question,  for  inability  to  answer  which  Kant  has  re- 
jected them. 

Kant's  refutation  of  the  theory  of  Perfection  is  a  matter  of 
definitions.  With  him  perfection  "  is  the  fitness  or  sufficiency 
of  a  thing  for  all  sorts  of  purposes,"16  ability  to  do  something 
which  must  on  this  account  be  of  superior  value.  In  the 
end,  however,  he  adopts  perfection  as  "an  end  which  is  also 
a  duty,"  and  in  so  doing  sets  aside  the  above  definition  for 
the  broader  conception  of  it  as  the  conquest  of  will  over 
animal  nature,  and  as  a  specific  mode  of  realizing  humanity 
as  an  end  in  itself.17  Indeed,  no  other  interpretation  can  be 
given  to  the  second  formula  of  the  categorical  imperative 
than  that  it  commands  perfection  as  an  unconditional  duty. 

Returning  over  the  theorems  which  we  have  outlined, 
observe  that  in  the  first,  Kant  makes  the  mistake  of  thinking 
that  every  "presupposed  object  of  the  faculty  of  desire"  is 
necessarily  presupposed  as  the  ground  of  determination  of  the 
will,  that  "to  presuppose  an  object  which  gives  pleasure  is 
to  presuppose  it  for  its  pleasure."  Not  only  is  this  a  mis- 
take in  itself;  it  also  cuts  off  Kant's  principle  from  its  only 
means  of  becoming  more  than  empty.  A  principle,  to  be 
more  than  a  principle ;  to  be,  that  is,  the  determinator  of  the 
will,  necessarily  presupposes  an  object  towards  which  the 
will  is  to  be  motived.  In  order  to  preserve  the  purity  of 
Duty  as  a  moral  motive  in  this  case  Kant  saw  clearly  that 
the  object  must  not  be  sought  on  account  of  its  desirability. 
But  it  is,  to  say  the  least,  essentially  erroneous  to  think 
that  the  form  can  have  any  importance  apart  from  the  mat- 
ter concerned  in  the  judgment.  The  law  of  duty  may  be 
necessary  and  universal,  but  it  can  have  no  application  when 
formulated  out  of  relation  to  the  matter  to  which  man's  duty 
extends.     Let  the  law  command   consistency  with  self,  or 


aty. 


44  THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  TERIAL  [44 

with  the  law,  or  the  realization  of  an  object  outside  the  self, 
or  what  you  please,  in  any  case  it  presupposes  the  matter 
given  in  experience  to  tell  what  duty  is  at  any  one  time. 
Kant  is  trying  in  ethics,  as  has  been  said  of  his  Deduction 
of  the  Categories  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  to  solve  a 
problem  by  means  of  the  intellect  alone,  which  belongs  as 
essentially  to  the  matter  with  which  intellect  deals.  In  order 
to  preserve  the  purity  of  the  law  as  a  motive,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  abstract  from  the  pleasure  inherent  in  the  attainment 
of  its  object ;  it  was  not  necessary,  it  was  ruinous,  to  rule 
out  the  object  altogether. 

It  is  not  against  pleasure  as  an  object  that  Kant  is  contend- 
ing, but  as  a  moral  motive,  a  principle  of  determination  of  the 
will.  He  has  no  puritanical  objections  to  happiness  in  itself. 
But  the  strange  fact  is  that  he  recognized  that  an  object  may 
be  sought  without  being  desired  for  itself,  *.*.,  being  made  a 
determining  principle  of  the  will;18  but,  except  in  one  fleet- 
ing instance,19  he  refused  to  see  further  that  pleasure  may  in- 
here in  this  object,  and  not  be  the  determining  principle. 
That  the  "  principle  of  self-love "  determines  the  will  by 
a  desire  for  a  specific  object  is  undoubtedly  the  opinion 
that  is  uppermost  in  his  mind  in  stating  the  second  theo- 
rem. But,  however  ignoble  the  principle  of  self-love  is,  it  is 
not  at  all  true  that  a  specific  end  may  not  be  made  the  ob- 
ject of  the  will  and  not  fall  under  the  head  of  this  principle. 
The  happiness  of  all  is  a  universal  and  formal,  and  as  such 
may  be  the  ground  of  determination  of  the  will.  One's  own 
happiness  is  necessarily  included  in  the  universal  happiness. 
Now  it  is  our  duty  to  realize  the  summum  bonum,  but  not  to 
make  it  the  determining  principle  of  the  will.  In  the  same 
way  one  may  realize  his  own  happiness,  making  universal 
happiness  the  determining  maxim  of  the  will.  Presented  in 
this  way  there  is  no  conflict  between  autonomy  and  the  real- 
ization of  private  happiness  as  an  end.     This  point  of  view, 


45]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  45 

however,  it  never  seems  to  occur  to  Kant  to  take  (except  in 
the  one  instance  noted)  ;  but  he  always  takes  the  stand  that 
the  being  seeking  an  object  whose  realization  is  pleasure, 
must  be  determined  by  the  pleasure  or  by  the  object  as 
pleasant. 

The  Deduction  of  tlie  Principles  of  Pure  Practical  Reason 

The  theorems  of  which  we  have  sketched  the  outline  are 
the  principles  of  pure  practical  reason  (corresponding  to  the 
principles  of  the  pure  understanding  in  the  first  Critique). 
It  is  next  necessary  to  substantiate  the  principles  for  analy- 
sis ;  and  as  Kant  has  "  finally  reduced  the  definite  conception 
of  morality  to  the  idea  of  freedom,"*0  his  task  reduces  itself 
to  the  necessity  of  establishing  the  objective  reality  of  this 
concept.  The  great  difficulty  in  accomplishing  this  object 
arises  from  the  fact  that  there  are  no  sensible  intuitions  giv- 
ing rise  to  the  idea  of  freedom,  and  its  reality  cannot  on  that 
account  be  proven  by  showing  it  in  examples  drawn  from  ex- 
perience. Nor  indeed  can  the  existence  of  the  moral  law  or 
of  freedom  be  proven  at  all  by  theoretical  reason.  The  exis- 
tence of  the  law  is  a  fact,  and  requires  no  ground  of  justifica- 
tion ;  it  is  absolute.  If  the  law  exists,  freedom  is  a  reality : 
there  can  be  no  duty  and  no  law,  if  there  be  no  power  of 
obeying  the  law.21  The  proof  of  the  objective  reality  of  free- 
dom draws  with  it  that  of  the  existence  of  a  supersensible 
world  ;  for  the  very  concept  of  freedom  is  of  a  causality  inde- 
pendent on  physical  causation. 

With  the  acceptance  of  the  objective  reality  of  freedom  we 
have  an  idea  of  the  causality  which  has  got  into  the  mind 
by  other  means  than  through  the  category  of  causality. 
Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  its  positive  conception  is  one  of 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  kind  of  causality,  freedom  is 
itself  a  category.  It  is  not  an  instance  of  causation  abstracted 
from  sense-percepts  and  subsumed  under  a  category ;    it  is 


46  THE  FORMAL  AXD  MA  TERIAL  [46 

a  form,  a  concept  of  causation,  and  ranks  with  the  category 
itself. 

Is  this  category  a  function  of  the  understanding,  a  form  of 
conceiving,  as  are  the  others?  That  it  is,  Kant  infers  from 
the  impossibility  of  thinking  oneself  to  be  other  than  free. 
As  in  our  relation  with  the  ordinary  objects  of  sense,  we  can- 
not think  except  we  conceive  them  as  caused ;  so  in  forming 
our  conception  of  rational  beings,  we  cannot  think  any  such 
unless  we  conceive  them  as  free.  Only  on  the  supposition 
of  freedom's  reality  can  the  moral  law  be  possible ;  for  this 
is  the  condition  which  is  included  in  every  conception  of  the 
moral  law,  that  the  concept  of  responsibility  (the  law)  has 
no  application  except  to  a  being  whom  we  judge  to  be  free. 

What  is  the  "  objective  reality  "  which  is  predicated  of  the 
idea  of  freedom  ?  Is  it  the  reality  of  a  notion,  of  a  category, 
of  a  (Platonic)  Idea,  or  of  a  thing  to  be  realized  but  not  now 
existing?  There  are  many  considerations  in  favor  of  the 
last  view ;  but  undoubtedly  if  the  faculty  of  freedom  is  a  cate- 
gory, it  has  the  same  reality  as  a  category.  The  concept  of 
freedom  is  therefore  a  functional  activity  of  the  Understand- 
ing. In  sensible  experience  we  do  not  intuite  a  notion  of 
cawse ;  we  see  a  chain  of  events  and  cannot  help  thinking 
causality  to  be  present;  exactly  so,  when  we  see  a  man 
doing  his  duty  we  cannot  help  thinking  freedom  to  be  there. 
This,  it  will  be  observed,  does  not  prove  the  existence  of 
freedom  as  a  spontaneous  cause,  but  only  that  its  conception 
is  a  form  of  judgment  to  which  we  refer  moral  actions ;  that 
is,  that  we  cannot  think  in  moral  matters  without  assuming 
it.  Nevertheless  the  only  ultimate  proof  of  the  fact  of  free- 
dom is  this  necessity. 

Exactly  what  Kant  would  understand  by  the  "fact"  of 
freedom  is  very  hard  to  decide.  If  it  is  only  an  idea  as  he 
says,  what  influence  can  it  have  as  a  cause?  Granted 
there  is  a  functional  activity  of  the  understanding  by  which 


47]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  47 

we  are  compelled  to  think  man  as  free,  of  what  importance 
is  that  if  it  does  not  give  him  the  power  of  influencing  phe- 
nomenal  events?  Kant  apparently  believes  in  the  will  as  a 
spontaneous  cause  and  as  a  power  of  alternative  choice,  but 
that  it  has  no  influence  on  actions,  as  they  are  phenomena ; 
after  the  will  has  made  its  choice  the  succession  of  natural 
events  goes  on  as  though  the  will  did  7iot  exist.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  assumes  continually  that  freedom  is  a  causality 
in  the  same  sense  as  cause  in  the  physical  world.  This  is 
shown  in  the  thesis  (though  he  did  not  necessarily  accept 
that)  of  the  third  Antinomy,  wherein  it  is  shown  that  a  free 
cause  is  necessary  to  explain  phenomena,  and  phenomena  are 
subject  to  physical  causation ;  and  again  he  says  that  free- 
dom is  the  power  man  has  of  controlling  his  appetites,  in 
other  words,  of  interfering  in  the  course  of  natural  caus- 
ation.22 Apparently,  therefore,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
actual  experience,  the  matter  of  Ethics,  Kant's  freedom  of 
the  will  is  a  piece  of  logical  humor.  When  he  says,  for 
instance,  that  "  a  being  that  cannot  act  except  with  the  idea 
of  freedom  is  bound  by  the  same  laws  that  would  oblige  a 
being  who  was  actually  free,"23  it  does  not  seem  to  occur  to 
him  to  ask,  What  is  such  a  law  and  what  effect  can  it  have 
on  the  life  of  the  being  it  obligates?  Such  freedom  would 
be  an  illusion,  and  this  argument  is  one  to  delight  the  heart 
of  a  determinist.  By  limiting  freedom  to  the  intelligible 
world  he  denied  the  possibility  of  free  causality  in  the  phe- 
nomenal world,  and  thus  affirmed  the  antithesis  of  the  third 
Antinomy.  Cutting  off  the  freedom  of  the  will  from  phe- 
nomena prevented  his  holding  to  a  belief  in  alternative 
choice ;  to  which,  however,  he  sometimes  inconsistently 
gives  expression. 

These  difficulties  are  left  unsolved  by  the  "Deduction" 
and  prevent  one's  accepting  the  arguments  and  conclusions 
of  that  section.     But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  conclude  that 


48  THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  TERIAL  [43 

Kant  has  left  his  doctrine  in  this  perilous  position ;  from 
which  he  finally  rescues  it  in  the  "  Critical  Examination  of 
the  Analytic."2* 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  preceding  criticism  I  have 
assumed  that  man  as  noumenon  and  man  as  phenomenon  can 
have  no  possible  interrelation.  Such,  however,  is  not  Kant's 
conception.  Homo  noumenon  and  homo  phenomenon  are  two 
utterly  irreducible  elements  of  the  one  man,  but  they  are 
only  one  man.  They  act  indissolubly  and  together  through 
the  organic  unity  of  the  individual.  I  have  been  supposing 
them  to  be  two  beings  bound  up  in  one  body,  but  having  no 
organic  relation  at  all ;  each  doing  its  work  and  interfering  not 
at  all  with  the  other.  They  are,  on  the  other  hand,  one  and  the 
same  being:  noumenon  is  the  man  out  of  time,  phenomenon 
is  the  man  in  time.  Under  this  conception,  what  does  Free- 
dom mean?  Freedom  is  the  power  the  Reason  has  of  /re- 
determining the  part  which  the  will  as  a  spontaneous  cause 
shall  take  in  the  course  of  events.  Before  an  event  occurs, 
the  reason  can  forecast  it  with  some  degree  of  accuracy,  and 
decide  that  it  will  use  its  causality  in  one  direction  or  an- 
other. The  reason,  therefore,  acts  out  of  (before)  time,  and 
for  it  to  be  determinable  in  time  is  a  contradiction  of  its  defi- 
nition as  a  deliberative  faculty.  Reason  asks  always,  What 
next?  and  not,  What  am  I  doing  now?  The  latter  is  the 
business  of  consciousness  (spontaneity).  Reason  is  the  fac- 
ulty of  deliberation ;  will  is  a  spontaneous  cause :  combine 
the  two  notions  organically  and  we  have  the  deliberative  will, 
the  practical  reason.  As  a  phenomenon,  one  belongs  in  the 
chain  of  cause  and  effect;  consciousness  is  the  power  of 
acting  spontaneously  (from  within) ;  reason  is  the  power 
of  directing  this  spontaneity  in  a  certain  channel,  subject  to 
the  laws  of  causation  :  the  whole  makes  of  a  rational  finite 
being  a  free  cause. 


49]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  49 

The  Concept  of  an  Object  of  pure  practical  Reason. 

In  the  Introductory  Section  of  this  essay  we  have  men- 
tioned Kant's  definition  of  Ethics  as  the  science  of  Ends. 
Its  very  conception,  therefore,  entails  an  object;  but  only  an 
object  of  thought,  an  Ideal  existing  as  a  form  in  the  concep- 
tion of  the  Reason.  Under  this  conception  we  may  include 
two  of  the  Ideas  of  Reason,  Freedom  and  God.  One  notion 
of  freedom  is  of  a  continually  progressive  state ;  for  the  will 
though  desiring  to  be  free  from  the  influence  of  the  inclina- 
tions can  only  gradually  attain  that  end,  and  never  thor- 
oughly in  this  life.  Of  God  two  general  conceptions  may 
be  found  in  the  Ethics:  God  as  Perfection25  and  as  Su- 
preme Dispenser  of  Happiness.  This  is  material  perfection 
however,  not  a  quality  of  will,  and  Kant  denies  that  it  is 
an  ethical  end,  though  this  opinion  is  held  by  some  theo- 
sophists.26  It  is  an  Idea  but  not  an  Ideal  of  Reason.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  Idea  of  Immortality ;  it  is  not  an  end, 
valuable  in  its  own  worth,  but  is  existence  in  that  amount  of 
time  necessary  to  perfection. 

Leaving  out  of  view,  therefore,  these  Ideas,  an  Ideal,  an 
object  of  pure  practical  reason,  is  an  effect  possible  to  be 
produced  through  freedom ;  and  is,  therefore,  only  an  idea 
existing  in  the  intelligible  world.  The  only  objects  of  prac- 
tical reason  are  those  of  good  and  evil.  The  Ideal  of  course 
must  be  the  former;  more  specifically  (as  we  learn  in  the 
Metaphysic  of  Ethics)  they  are  one's  own  perfection  and  the 
happiness  of  others.37 

In  the  treatment  of  the  object  as  an  element  of  formal 
morality,  we  have  a  somewhat  different  conception  of  moral- 
ity as  a  whole.  The  forms  treated  of  in  the  Grundlegung 
are  presuppositions  necessary  to  the  very  conception  of 
morality.  The  formal  object  on  the  other  hand  is  the  matter 
of  the  will.  As  such  it  must  be  excluded  from  pure  moral- 
ity ;  for  the  goodness  of  the  volition  will  be  destroyed  if  the 


5° 


THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  TERIAL 


[50 


/ 


will  be  determined  by  desire  for  the  object.  Nevertheless, 
an  object  is  a  necessary  presupposition,  and  in  so  far  it  is 
formal.  But  though  an  end  was  found  in  the  Grundlegung, 
it  was  humanity  as  an  absolutely  worthy  end.  Now  Kant 
succeeds  later  in  showing  to  his  own  satisfaction  that  to  treat 
humanity  as  an  end,  is  to  will  one's  own  perfection  and 
others'  happiness,  but  it  is  only  by  a  stretch  of  the  imagina- 
tion that  we  can  believe  him  to  be  meaning  the  same  thing 
in  both  cases.  For  in  the  first  case  morality  pertains  to  will 
only ;  in  the  Critique  it  is  actions  which  are  good  in  them- 
selves,  if  they  are  produced  by  a  will  determined  by  the 
universal  law.28  This  statement  is  the  mark  in  the  progress 
of  Kant's  theory  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete.  At  first 
the  practical  reason  had  been  concerned,  in  his  conception, 
only  with  the  determination  of  the  will  without  regard  to 
ends.  Then  an  end  was  introduced,  the  conception  of  Man 
as  an  end  in  himself.  Here  the  last  step  is  made,  where 
reason  is  employed  for  the  determination  of  causes  to  effects 
in  the  sensible  nature  of  man,  his  physical  welfare  being 
advanced  by  practical  reason  (besides,  as  formerly,  by  the 
theoretical)  ;  and  where  actions,  ends  outside  Humanity,  are 
denominated  as  good  in  themselves.  "The  moral  law  com- 
mands me  to  make  the  highest  possible  good  in  a  world  the 
ultimate  object  of  all  my  conduct."29  Although  this  may 
refer  to  the  good  only  of  the  rational  beings  in  the  world, 
yet  the  general  impression  at  this  time  is  that  his  conception 
of  good  has  broadened,  and  this  opinion  is  strengthened  by 
the  classification  of  certain  actions  as  absolute  good.  Kant 
himself  seems  to  realize  this  tendency  and  its  necessity,  espe- 
cially in  the  section  on  the  Typic,  where  he  speaks  of  "  special 
difficulties  arising  from  this,  that  a  law  of  freedom  [super- 
physical  causality]  is  to  be  applied  to  actions  which  belong 
to  physical  nature."30 

Although  it  is  a  duty  to  realize  the  good  as  an  ethical  end, 


5  i  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  E THICS  5  ! 

yet  its  concept  must  not  be  determined  before  the  moral 
law,  but  only  after  it  and  by  means  of  it.  For  the  action  is 
good  in  itself  but  not  on  account  of  itself  (through  any  in- 
trinsic worth  of  its  own),  that  is,  its  performance  is  a  duty, 
but  only  because  by  means  of  the  law  we  learn  that  it  is 
good.  The  only  way  to  prevent  heteronomy,  therefore,  is 
to  determine  by  the  law  what  action  is  to  be  done,  and  its 
goodness  will  follow  because  it  conforms  to  the  law.  There- 
fore, the  notions  of  good  and  evil  do  not  originally  refer  at 
all  to  objects  (as  do  the  categories),  but  to  the  volition  whose 
goodness  is,  as  it  were,  transferred  to  the  action  without  re- 
gard to  the  pleasure  or  pain  experienced  in  it. 

What  are  the  actions  to  accomplish  which  a  will,  however 
determined,  must  exercise  its  volition?  Plainly  those  only 
of  the  sensible  world.  That  is,  our  formal  object  of  the  will 
must  be  filled,  if  at  all,  with  matter  supplied  to  the  moral 
judgment  by  sensibility  according  to  laws  of  natural  causa- 
tion in  the  phenomenal  world.  Now  as  freedom  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  causation  of  phenomena,  it  may  very  well 
happen  that  an  act  determined  on  according  to  the  law  of 
duty  is  not  possible  as  a  matter  of  fact.  In  such  a  case  how 
are  we  to  judge  of  failure  to  accomplish  a  moral  end?  The 
solution  of  the  difficulty,  says  Kant,  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
having  once  determined  his  volition  in  accordance  with  the 
law,  a  rational  being  is  not  responsible  for  the  outcome  of 
the  event,  whether  it  be  according  as  he  has  willed  or  not.11 
The  question  brings  out  an  important  fact  however,  that 
Kant  recognises  that  the  general  conception  of  the  good  is 
not  fit  to  serve  as  matter  of  the  will ;  its  matter  must  come 
from  the  facts  of  daily  experience.  In  recognition  of  this 
fact  it  is  necessary  to  state  the  categorical  imperative  in 
terms  of  natural  causation,  thus :  ask  yourself  whether,  if  the 
action  you  propose  were  to  take  place  by  a  law  of  nature ', 
you  could  regard  it  as  possible  by  your  own  will.32 


52  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  r>2 

This  is  the  Type  of  the  moral  law.  For  instance,  I  see  a 
man  killed  by  accident.  Judging  from  it  as  a  fact  of  nature, 
I  conclude  that  it  would  be  as  evil  morally  to  will  myself  to 
commit  such  an  act  as  it  is  for  it  to  happen  unintentionally 
in  the  course  of  events.  Of  the  Type  of  the  law  it  is  to  be 
observed,  that  being  formal  and  universal  it  is  as  empty  as 
we  have  already  seen  the  categorical  imperative  to  be,  and 
consequently  it  is  impossible  to  draw  trustworthy  conclusions 
from  it. 

The  Motives  of  Pure  Practical  Reason 

In  the  Grundlegung,33  Kant  has  distinguished  between  the 
spring  (Triebfeder)  as  the  subjective  ground  of  desire,  and 
the  motive  or  objective  ground  of  volition  (Bewegungs- 
grund).  Chapter  III.  of  the  Critique  is  on  the  "springs"  of 
pure  practical  reason.  This  is  translated  "  motives "  by 
Abbott,  Kant  having  altered  his  terms ;  for  he  has  already 
said  that  a  volition  resting  on  a  spring  is  material,  but  now 
treats  of  such  as  formal.  He  is  therefore  using  the  word 
spring  in  the  same  sense  that  he  previously  used  motive. 

If  an  act  rests  on  feeling  (Triebfeder)  it  may  conform  to 
the  law,  but  will  possess  only  legality.34  To  be  moral  it 
must  find  its  ground  of  determination  (motive,  Bewegungs- 
grund)  in  the  form  of  the  law.  In  maintaining  this  Kant 
asserts  that  the  form  can  and  must  be  both  objective  and 
subjective  ground  of  determination  of  the  will.  In  filling 
these  two  offices,  it  is  dangerous  to  allow  other  motives  (for 
instance,  that  of  interest  as  upheld  by  Hutcheson)  to  co- 
operate with  the  sense  of  Duty.  The  essential  point  of  all 
determination  of  the  will  by  the  law  is  that  as  a  free  will  it  is 
determined  simply  by  the  law  without  the  co-operation  of 
sensible  impulses  and  even  to  the  rejection  of  all  such.35 

In  withdrawing  from  the  aid  of  such  impulses  or  in  com- 
batting their  influence,  the  action  of  the  law  as  a  motive  is 
only  negative;   the  succeeding  feeling  may  be  called  a  pain. 


53]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  53 

Consequently,  as  law  as  a  motive  can  be  known  a  priori 
only,  we  have  a  case  in  which  we  can  from  a  priori  consider- 
ations determine  the  relation  of  a  cognition  to  a  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  pain. 

All  inclinations,  regarded  as  material  motives,  constitute 
self-regard.  This  is  either  self-love  (selfishness)  or  satis- 
faction with  oneself  (self-conceit).  There  is  a  self-love 
which  on  account  of  its  reasonableness  is  only  checked  by 
the  pure  practical  reason.  Self-conceit,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  law  strikes  down  altogether,  and  in  so  doing  commands 
respect.  Respect  thus  becomes  the  only  feeling  known 
a  priori y  being  the  result  of  an  intellectual  cause.  ^ 

The  moral  law  performs  three  offices : 36  it  is  the  formal 
determining  principle  of  action  by  means  of  practical  reason  ; 
as  such  it  informs  the  subject  of  the  law  that  his  volition  must 
conform  to  what  the  sense  of  duty  directs  him  to  perform. 
The  law  is  also  a  material  and  objective  determining  prin- 
ciple of  the  objects  of  actions  in  so  far  as  in  willing  it  is  to  be 
decided  whether  they  are  good  or  evil ;  that  is,  the  law  is 
capable  of  denoting  what  ends  are  good  or  the  opposite. 
The  statement  of  these  two  offices  are  a  reiteration  of  the 
first  two  formulae  of  the  categorical  imperative,  and  corres- 
ponds to  the  division  of  a  maxim  into  a  form  (its  universal 
validity)  and  a  matter  (its  end).37  Besides  these,  the  law, 
as  it  produces  a  feeling,  respect  for  itself,  is  also  a  subjective 
determining  principle,  a  motive  to  action.  It  is  a  motive 
which  deprives  the  will  of  every  material  spring,  taking 
"from  self-love  its  influence,  and  from  self-conceit  its  illu- 
sion." The  law  is  the  objective  moral  motive;  the  sub- 
jective motive  is  respect  for  the  law.3!^ 

Respect  applies  to  persons,  not  to  things.  It  is  "a  tribute 
which  we  cannot  refuse  to  merit,  whether  we  will  or  not."  39 
Although  a  feeling,  it  is  one  neither  of  pleasure  nor  pain : 
the  former  is  shown  in  the  fact  that  we  yield  to  it  reluctantly, 


A 


54  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [54 

and  always  endeavor  to  reduce  the  credit  due  a  man  for  his 
morality.  That  it  is  not  painful  is  known  to  those  who  have 
risen  far  enough  above  self-conceit  to  contemplate  the  law  in 
its  majesty.  In  motivation  of  the  will  through  respect  for 
the  law,  the  will  is  first  determined  objectively  and  directly ; 
freedom  restricts  the  influence  of  the  inclinations,  and  thus 
produces  a  feeling  of  displeasure,  which  can  be  known  a 
priori  from  the  moral  law.  The  feeling  of  displeasure,  how- 
ever, is  itself  a  sign  of  the  ascendancy  of  the  law  over  material 
considerations,  and  is  followed  by  respect  for  the  law.  Re- 
spect (all  pathological  obstacles  having  been  removed)  thus 
becomes  the  motive  of  the  will ;  but  only  to  objects  approved 
by  the  sense  of  duty.  An  action  according  to  the  law  fol- 
lowing on  motivation  through  respect  is  duty ;  which  includes 
in  its  conception  obligation,  a  determination  to  actions  with- 
out regard  to  the  reluctance  felt  in  doing  them.  That  is, 
obligation  is  the  duty  arising  from  the  necessity  that  the  will 
be  determined  by  the  law ;  duty,  however,  is  a  broader  con- 
ception and  includes  with  this  moral  determination  the  ne- 
cessity of  objective  agreement  of  the  action  with  the  law.40 

The  strongest  argument  that  can  be  brought  against  the 
moral  sense  theory  (and  it  applies  more  forcibly  to  more 
egoistic  schools)  is  that  it  disregards  the  necessity  of  con- 
straint by  a  sense  of  duty  to  check  the  inclinations,  as  human 
nature  is  constituted  and  must  ever  remain  so  long  as  physi- 
cal human  nature  endures.  We  can  never  be  quite  free  from 
desires  and  inclinations,  and  on  that  account "  stand  under  a 
discipline  [a  restraint]  of  reason,  and  in  all  our  maxims  must 
not  forget  our  subjection  to  it,  nor  withdraw  anything  there- 
from, or  by  an  egotistic  presumption  diminish  aught  of  the 
authority  of  the  law  (although  our  own  reason  gives  it)  so 
as  to  set  the  determining  principle  of  our  will,  even  though 
the  law  be  conformed  to,  anywhere  else  but  in  the  law  itself 
and  in  respect  for  this  law.     Duty  and  obligation  are  the 


55]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  55 

only  names  that  we  must  give  to  our  relation  to  the  moral 
law." 4I  If  constraint  of  the  faculty  of  desire  can  be  got  only 
through  a  discipline  of  reason^  then  that  is  a  sufficient  justifi- 
cation for  the  rationalistic  standpoint,  for  the  view  that  the 
attainment  of  morality  depends  on  the  presence  in  the  agent 
of  a  sense  of  responsibility,  which  must  determine  the  will 
by  presenting  its  moral  principles  as  unconditioned  laws. 

In  what  is  the  basis  of  this  Duty  which  governs  rational 
nature?  It  can  spring  from  "nothing  less  than  a  power 
which  elevates  man  above  himself  (as  a  part  of  the  world  of 
sense),"  which  connects  him  with  an  order  (conceivable 
only  to  the  intellect)  which  commands  the  sensible  world. 
"This  power  is  nothing  but  personality ," '42  and  personality  is 
independence  on  the  mechanism  of  nature  and  also  the  fac- 
ulty of  a  being  which  is  subject  to  laws  given  by  its  own 
reason.  Duty,  that  is,  can  be  the  offspring  of  reason  alone ; 
it  is  a  form,  an  idea,  not  a  sense  as  English-speaking  people 
have  chosen  to  regard  it.  , 

This  then  is  the  nature  of  the  true  motive  of  pure  practical 
reason ;  it  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  product,  a  conception, 
of  the  reason  itself.  It  is  no  other  than  the  pure  moral  law, 
inasmuch  as  that  makes  us  conscious  of  the  sublimity  of  our 
own  supersensible  existence  and  subjectively  produces  re- 
spect for  our  higher  nature.43 

One  cannot  fail  to  observe  in  Kant's  conception  of  respect 
for  the  law  an  analogy  to  the  moral  sense  of  Hutcheson. 
Many  of  Kant's  statements  as  to  what  respect  is  not  seem 
directly  aimed  at  Hutcheson's  description  of  the  attributes 
and  office  of  the  moral  feeling,  with  a  view  to  denying  its 
validity  and  truthfulness.  The  two  feelings  are  both  inde- 
pendent of  the  will  and  both  act  without  any  relation  to 
pleasure  or  pain,  neither  being  connected  with'  objects  of  in- 
tuition. Reverence  for  the  majesty  of  the  law  is  called  forth 
in  the  midst  of,  and  even  by,  displeasure  at  the  baffling  of 


5 6  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  [56 

lust ;  Moral  Sense  compels  love  toward  the  benefactor  of  his 
fellow-man  even  when  the  benefaction  is  a  deprivation  of  in- 
terest to  one's  self.  Kant  grants  that  being  a  feeling,  respect 
cannot  give  rise  to  the  idea  of  duty,  which  is  necessary  to 
moral  experience ;  in  Hutcheson's  case,  duty  is  done  away 
with  as  Moral  Sense  is  a  faculty  immediately  leading  men  to 
love  the  good  fcr  its  own  sake.  Reverence  is  known  a  priori, 
but  only  as  an  effect,  being  involuntarily  produced  by  a  con- 
ception of  the  moral  law ;  Moral  Sense,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  regarded  as  an  implanted  faculty  of  perceiving  immediately 
the  goodness  of  an  act. 

The  Dialectic  of  Pure  Practical  Reason 

The  Dialectic  of  practical  reason  arises  from  a  controversy 
as  to  the  object  of  the  will.  The  practical  reason  must  have 
an  object  on  which  to  act,  but  must  not  be  determined 
thereby.  The  proper  and  only  moral  object  is  the  Good. 
The  time  has  now  come  to  define  the  Good,  and  it  is  in  doing 
so  that  reason  falls  into  controversy ;  for  practical  reason 
(the  will)  is  an  element  of  the  faculty  of  desire,  whose  object 
is  happiness.  The  end  of  the  will,  considered  as  reason,  is 
virtue.  In  deciding  on  the  constituents  of  the  true  moral 
object,  we  must  decide  on  the  relation  of  these  two  elements, 
Virtue  and  Happiness. 

According  to  Stoic  doctrine,  virtue  is  its  own  reward. 
This  may  mean  either  one  of  two  things:  that  happiness  is 
not  a  state  worthy  of  man,  he  should  be  above  trying  to  be 
happy;  or  else  that  happiness  is  included  in  the  very  notion 
of  virtue,  and  that  one  may  test  his  happiness  by  this,  that  if 
he  is  virtuous,  he  is  certain  to  be  happy ;  if  he  is  not  virtuous, 
his  happiness  is  a  delusion.  Kant  denies  both  of  these  the- 
ses, and  his  position  differs  from  the  Stoic's  radically  in  this, 
that  he  denies  positively  that  one  can  be  moral  and  at  the  same 
time  seek  either  virtue  or  happiness.     His  Ethics  is  properly 


57]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  57 

a  denial  of  both  Stoic  and  Epicurean  doctrine,  and  the  reason 
he  aimed  his  remarkable  assault  against  the  latter  only  Was 
not  chiefly  his  hatred  of  hedonism,  but  because  in  his  day 
no  other  end  but  happiness  was  dwelt  upon  as  of  value ;  no 
one  thought  of  determining  himself  by  the  amount  of  virtue 
to  be  gained.  He  wished  to  defend  virtue  by  denying  that 
it  or  anything  else  was  a  moral  end ;  by  maintaining  that 
Ethics  is  concerned  with  purpose,  not  with  ends. 

When  we  take  these  facts  into  consideration  we  understand 
Kant's  position  in  the  Dialectic  much  more  clearly.  His 
attack  on  pleasure  in  the  Analytic  included  in  its  range  vir- 
tue also,  in  so  far  as  they  are  both  determining  principles  of 
the  will ;  as  anything  else  he  had  attacked  neither  pleasure 
nor  virtue.  When,  therefore,  he  speaks  of  the  Good  as  the 
object  of  practical  reason,  he  does  not  mean  the  end  which 
one  ought  to  seek,  but  that  which  inevitably  follows  on  obedi- 
ence to  the  law. 

Now  every  one  acknowledges  that  true  obedience  to  the 
law  brings  virtue  ;  and  the  Stoics  alleged  that  consciousness 
of  its  attainment  is  happiness.  Kant's  conception  of  the  re- 
lation of  reason  and  sense  forbids  his  taking  this  view  ;  virtue 
in  his  opinion  does  not  include  happiness  any  more  than 
happiness  includes  virtue.  Nevertheless  he  is  not  ready  in 
ascetic  fashion  to  renounce  happiness,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
asserts  that  happines  is  a  true  element  of  the  Summum 
Bonum. 

Virtue  is  a  good,  the  highest  (summum)  good.  But 
summum  is  used  in  two  senses :  it  may  denote  the  condition 
which  is  itself  unconditioned  (supreme)  ;  or,  the  whole 
which  is  not  part  of  a  greater  whole  of  the  same  kind  (per- 
fect). Virtue  is  the  supreme  good;  but  in  the  real  summum 
bonum,  the  perfect  good,  reason  demands  that  happiness  be 
included.  Virtue  is  not  alone  "  the  object  of  the  desires  of 
rational  finite  beings ;   for  this  requires  happiness  also,  and 


58  THE  FORMAL  AND  MATERIAL  Y?% 

that  not  merely  in  the  partial  eyes  of  the  person  who  makes 
himself  an  end,  but  even  in  the  judgment  of  an  impartial 
reason."  "  The  reason  here  spoken  of  is  not  the  reason  pre- 
viously conceived  as  opposed  to  sense  ;  it  is  reason  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  organic  unity  of  the  individual  demand- 
ing that  the  sensible  nature  be  not  excluded  from  the  moral 
world,  but  that  a  synthesis,  a  causal  nexus,  be  made  between 
the  objects  of  the  natural  and  the  rational  man,  between  hap- 
piness and  virtue. 

The  siimmnm  bonum,  according  to  the  a  priori  cognition 
of  reason,  contains  both  virtue  and  happiness.  As  Kant  has 
denied  the  Stoics'  conception  of  the  relation  between  them, 
(which  was  analytic),  and  as  their  connection  is  cognized  a 
priori,  it  must  be  synthetic,  one  of  cause  and  effect.  Herein 
lies  the  dilemma:  either  the  desire  for  happiness  is  the  mo- 
tive to  maxims  of  virtue,  or  maxims  of  virtue  are  the  efficient 
cause  of  happiness.  The  first  thesis  is  impossible  because  it 
contradicts  the  conclusion  of  the  Analytic  that  a  will  which 
finds  its  maxims  in  the  desire  for  happiness  is  not  moral.  A 
desire  for  happiness  may  produce  good  deeds  (that  is,  deeds 
having  the  same  effect  as  though  prompted  by  Good  Will) 
but  never  a  virtuous  mind.  But  on  the  other  hand  we  do  not 
ordinarily  conceive  of  happiness  as  a  result  of  good  princi- 
ples, but  of  natural  causes  acting  on  the  organism  without 
reference  to  the  disposition  of  the  will,  or  the  state  of  one's 
mind.  Nevertheless — and  thus  the  antinomy  is  solved — this 
proposition  (that  virtue  produces  happiness),  is  false  only 
when  virtue  is  considered  as  a  form  of  causality  in  the  sensi- 
ble world.  But  when  we  consider  a  rational  being  as  cause 
in  the  noumenal  world,  it  becomes  possible  to  think  of  him 
as  connected  with  happiness,  as  effect  in  the  phenomenal 
world ;  not  immediately,  but  through  the  power  and  good- 
ness of  God.  The  happiness  thus  produced  is  naturally  not 
the  same  as  that  resulting  from  indulging  the  inclinations, 


59]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  $g 

inasmuch  as  it  has  no  physical  cause.  It  is  "  the  negative 
satisfaction  in  one's  existence"  called  self -contentment  ;^  and 
in  it  the  dialectic  establishes  as  possible  a  natural  and  neces- 
sary connection  between  the  consciousness  of  morality  and 
the  expectation  of  a  proportionate  happiness  as  its  result.46 

We  have  already  found  a  defence  of  Kant  in  his  intro- 
duction of  happiness  into  Ethics  in  the  fact  that  his  attack 
on  it  was  against  it  merely  as  a  determining  principle  of  the 
will.  He  saw  plainly  that  a  pure  morality,  by  which  man 
would  accomplish  his  best,  must  contain  no  intimation  of 
pleasure  to  be  gained  by  one's  attainments ;  for  almost  in- 
evitably one  will  allow  himself  to  be  motived  by  desire  for 
an  object,  and  the  morality  of  character  will  be  lost.  The 
law,  therefore,  must  make  no  promise  of  pleasure  to  be 
gained  by  obedience.  On  the  other  hand,  Ethics  is  a 
science  of  Ends,  and  must  in  this  capacity  treat  of  pleasure ; 
it  is  no  inconsistency  to  find  it  causally  connected  as  a  result 
with  morality. 

Nevertheless  there  is  an  inconsistency  in  Kant's  present 
point  of  view,  namely,  in  treating  happiness  as  a  moral  good 
at  all.  This  may  be  taken  in  two  ways :  he  meant  to  deny 
it  to  be  a  moral  good  only  when  its  maxims  are  taken  as  a 
determining  principle  of  the  will.  There  is  nothing,  how- 
ever, that  permits  us  to  make  this  supposition ;  it  is  contrary 
to  his  whole  dualistic  standpoint.  Or  else  it  was,  as  men- 
tioned before,  a  conquest  over  his  dualism  in  favor  of  the 
organic  unity  of  man.  In  this  case — though  its  logic  is 
undoubtedly  weak — it  seems  to  me  he  can  be  forgiven  for 
the  more  common-sense  view  of  things.  Moreover  it  is  an 
inconsistency  to  introduce  even  virtue  into  his  system  as  an 
object ;  it  may  be  a  result,  but  if  Duty  commands  uncondi- 
tionally not  even  virtue  can  be  brought  in  as  object,  unless 
it  be  identified  with  Duty.  To  do  this  is  the  intention  of  the 
second  formula  of  the  categorical  imperative.     But  in  con- 


60  THE  FORMAL  AND  MA  FERIAL  [60 

sidering  the  summutn  bonum  Kant  probably  had  in  mind  too 
strongly  the  Good  as  thought  by  the  Greeks  (a  perfecting 
of  the  whole  man)  to  remember  it  as  merely  an  attribute  of 
volitions. 

An  object  of  the  will  is  a  necessary  presupposition,  but  the 
moment  we  define  this  object  as  "  the  Good"  we  have  differ- 
entiated it  and  the  resulting  concept  is  material.  When  out 
of  the  empty  concept  of  Good  we  derive  one  which  is  sum- 
mum  bonum,  we  have  a  matter  of  which  the  former  concept 
is  the  form ;  and  this  matter  in  turn  is  form  to  the  two 
material  concepts  of  Perfection  and  Happiness.  This  is  the 
course  Kant  takes,  and  we  thus  have  a  progression  indefi- 
nitely from  formal  to  material,  viz : 

FORM 


Object  of  the  Will 


the  GOOD 


Sumtnum  Bonum 


Perfection  Happiness 


Physical,  Moral,  &c,  &c.  Physical,  Moral,  &c,  &c. 

MATTER. 

Here  matter  and  form  are  used  in  the  logical  meaning; 
and  it  was  by  such  a  progression  from  indefinite  to  definite 
running  through  his  several  works  that  Kant  sought  to  get  a 
content  to  his  formal  principle.     (He  died  before  he  got  it.) 

Kant's  conception  of  the  summum  bonum  as  a  necessary 
result  of  a  morally-determined  volition  demanded  that  one's 
own  happiness  be  included  in  it.47  This,  however,  was  con- 
trary to  his  notion  of  duty  (the  summum  bonum' s  realization 
being  such),  and  in  the  metaphysic  of  Ethics  he  concluded 


6 1  ]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT  yS  E  THICS  6  x 

that  one  ought  to  seek  every  one  else's  happiness,  but  not 
his  own.48 

From  the  necessity  of  realizing  the  siimmum  bonum  and 
the  impossibility  of  doing  so  in  this  life,  Kant  deduces  the 
fact  of  Immortality.  From  the  necessity  for  a  cause  adequate 
to  reward  perfect  Virtue  with  perfect  happiness,  he  arrives  at 
a  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  Of  his  conception  of  God 
and  Immortality  he  gives  but  little  hint;  they  are  both  a 
priori  Ideas,  necessary  to  the  realization  of  the  snmmum 
bonum  but  not  to  the  existence  of  morality,  as  is  Freedom. 
The  belief  in  immortality  on  this  ground  has  become  a  part 
of  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  day,  at  least  of  the  part 
of  it  called  the  most  "advanced."  The  principle  contained 
therein  is  probably  the  philosophic  basis  on  which  arose  a 
belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Purgatory — certainly  the  most 
philosophic  (when  cleared  of  its  superstitions)  of  current 
dogmas  of  the  Next  World.  Of  the  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  not  much  notice  need  be  taken.  It  would  have 
no  weight  whatever,  I  am  assured,  did  we  not  have  other 
foundation  for  that  belief.  These  Ideas,  as  such  (although 
not  categories,  as  is  Freedom),  might  have  been  shown  to 
be  functional  activities  of  the  understanding ;  that  is,  con- 
ceptions which  in  one  form  or  another  we  cannot  help  thinking. 
But  for  freedom  there  is  found  a  moral  necessity,  and  Kant 
seeks  for  one  for  each  of  these  two  Ideas.  That  he  has 
found  it  for  a  belief  in  God  I  do  not  think.  Certainly  a  re- 
ligion such  as  he  evolves  from  this  belief,  which  looks  upon 
moral  laws  as  divine  commands  solely  because  it  is  found  that 
God  can  dispense  happiness  as  a  reward,  is  as  ignoble  as  any 
egoistic  theory  of  morals ;  and  this  conclusion  is  the  only 
one  I  can  reach,  although  he  endeavors  to  show  that  under 
this  religion  one  can  still  be  determined  by  the  moral  law 
alone.49 

1  Abbott,  p.  146.  2  Ibid.,  p.  101.  s  Ibid.,  p.  361,  et  seq.  *  Epictetus. 


62  THE  FORMAL  AXD  MATERIAL  [62 

9 1  would  not  belittle  Stoicism;  but  have  stated  its  position  as  it  appears  to  one 
who  considers  it  as  doctrine,  separately  from  the  appreciation  of  its  upholders. 
For  the  truth  is  that  Stoicism  is  the  men  who  live  it.  Viewed  from  the  standpoint 
of  them,  its  empty  forms  become  filled  to  overflowing  with  awe-inspiring  person- 
ality and  need  no  other  content. 

6  Abbott,  p.  52.  7  Ibid.,  p.  107.  8  Ibid.,  p.  108. 

v  Ibid.,  p.  114.  10  Ibid.,  p.  122.  "  Ibid.,  p.  123. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  129.  13  Selby-Bigge :  British  Moralists,  p.  74. 

14  Ibid.  15  Ibid.,  p.  94.  i6  Abbott,  p.  1 30. 

17  Ibid.,  p.  297.  18  Ibid.,  p.  123. 

19 "The  conception  of  the  summum  bonum  as  a  whole  .  .  .  includes  my  own 
happiness,  yet  it  is  not  this  that  is  the  determining  principle  of  the  will  which  is 
enjoined  to  promote  the  summum  bonum,  but  the  moral  law."  {Abbott,  p.  227.) 
And  the  same  thing  is  observed  again,  in  almost  the  same  passage,  viz.,  p.  224. 

20  Abbott,  p.  67.  21  Ibid.,  p.  137. 

22  SempWs  Translation,  3d  Edition,  p.  299.  »  Abbott,  p.  67. 

**Ibid.,  pp.  182-201.  KIbid.,  p.  129.  26  Ibid.,  p  296. 

27  Nevertheless  the  object  of  practical  reason  as  treated  of  in  this  chapter,  is  not 
the  Ideal  but  actions  as  called  good,  bad  or  indifferent  in  actual  experience.  The 
object  as  Ideal  is  treated  under  the  head  of  the  summum  bonum. 

™  Abbott,  p.  153,  ™Ibid.,  p.  227.  ™  Ibid.,  p.  160. 

81  Ibid.,  p.  160.  32  Ibid.,  p.  161.  83  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

31  Ibid.,  p.  164.  35  Ibid,  p.  165.  36  Ibid.,  p.  168. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  54;  supra,  p.  25.      38  Ibid.,  p.  17.  39  Ibid.,  p.  169. 

40  Ibid.,  p.  174.     Compare  with  pages  278,  279. 

41  Ibid.,  p.  175.  K"-  Ibid.,  p.  180.  « Ibid.,  p.  182. 
"Ibid.,  p.  206.  45 Ibid.,  p.  214.  "Ibid.,  p.  215. 
47  Ibid.,  p.  227                            **  Ibid.,  p.  296.  *  Ibid.,  p.  226. 


IV 

THE   METAPHYSIC    OF   ETHICS 

"  Every  volition  must  have  an  object,  and  therefore,  a 
matter,"  is  Kant's  declaration  in  the  Critique;1  and  as  voli- 
tion is  the  psychological  subject  of  Ethics,  there  must  ac- 
cordingly be  an  Ethics  of  Ends.  The  categorical  imperative, 
according  to  the  form  of  which  one  must  will  in  order  to  be 
moral,  "  is  not  concerned  with  the  matter  of  the  action,  its 
intended  result"2  In  the  chapter  on  the  Object  of  Practical 
Reason,  however,  we  found  that  there  is  an  end  which  can 
conform  to  the  imperative,  namely,  the  realization  of  the 
Good.  In  what  this  realization  will  consist  is  the  subject  of 
investigation  in  the  Doctrines  of  Virtue  (Tugendlehre).  In 
so  far,  therefore,  this  treatise  is  on  the  matter  of  Ethics,  and 
is  a  continuation  of  the  chapter  on  the  object  of  practical 
reason  :  **  If  I  am  bound  to  make  something  which  lies  in  the 
notions  of  practical  reason  an  end  to  myself,  and  therefore 
besides  the  formal  determining  principle  of  the  elective  will 
(as  contained  in  law),  to  have  already  a  material  principle, 
an  end  which  can  be  opposed  to  the  end  derived  from  sen- 
sible impulses :  then  this  gives  the  notion  of  an  end  which  is 
itself  a  duty." 3  This  matter,  however,  is  still  an  empty  a 
priori  form  (conception)  of  the  reason,  and  any  categorical 
commanding  its  realization  must  be  subject  to  the  criticism 
attaching  to  every  universal  form,  that  it  may  be  formally 
consistent  and  not  be  materially  (actually)*  right. 

In  considering  the  matter  of  morality  JKant  divides  his 
subject  (Morals)  into  two  parts,  Jurisprudence  and  Ethics  J 
63  [63  ' 


64]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  64 

(Rechtslehre  and  Tugendlehre).  The  former  is  entirely 
formal,  and  pays  no  regard  to  ends.  (The  latter  considers 
ends,  but  only  such  as  are  also  virtues\  It  would  seem  from 
this  fact  that  Jurisprudence  is  a  purer  doctrine  of  morality 
than  Ethics;  but  the  contrary  is  true  because  (like  civil  law 
generally)  Jurisprudence  places  the  spring  m  something  else 
than  the  moral  law  (e.  g.,  fear  of  imprisonment).4  Conse- 
quently, Jurisprudence  requires  only  external  conformity  to 
the  law,  legality  or  morality  of  conduct  //Ethics  demands 
the  internal  morality  of  character,  or  action  from  love  of  the 
law.  Ethics  commands  "internal  actions,"  and  external 
actions  only  when  they  are  required  by  the  internal  law  of 
dut* 

(Ethics  considers  two  ends  which  are  duties :  one's  own 
perfection  and  others'  happiness.}  We  cannot  reverse  these 
and  make  others'  perfection  or  our  own  happiness  an  end. 
There  are  two  sorts  of  perfection :  ( 1 )  the  totality  of  char- 
acteristics which  constitute  a  Thing  (material  perfection) ; 
(2)  teleological  perfection  in  the  performance  of  an  Act 
(formal  perfection).6  The  latter  is  the  perfection  which  is 
a  duty.  It  is  the  highest  reach  of  the  endeavor  to  overcome 
the  passions,  and  consequently  is  cultivation  of  the  will,  or 
moral  disposition.  \  Kant's  conception  of  the  will  is  such  that 
it  does  not  allow  him  to  say  that  one  being  can  make  the 
cultivation  of  another's  will  his  end)  Nevertheless  another 
can  assist  very  materially  in  attaining  the  desired  end ;  else 
there  would  be  no  need  of  parents  guarding  their  children 
from  contaminating  circumstances  or  of  teaching  them  les- 
sons of  virtue. 

In  discussing  the  question  of  one's  own  harjriinesg,  it  will 
be  noticed  (Kant  does  not  prove  that  it  is  wrong  to  seek  it, 
but  merely  says  that  it  is  useless  to  discuss  it,  because  each 
one  of  us  is  already  and  inevitably  seeking  it.!  He  really 
does  not  discuss  it  as  a  duty  at  all,  as  there  is  no  object  in 


(5 5]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  65 

telling  men  it  is  their  duty  to  do  that  which  they  are  already 
doing  for  the  pleasure  found  in  it.  If,  therefore,  we  change 
our  conception  of  Duty  and  consider  it  solely  as  what  one 
ought  to  do,  without  reference  to  any  feeling  of  reluctance  to 
it,  or  of  pleasure  or  pain  in  the  doing,  we  will  find  the  com- 
mand "Love  yourself"  to  be  as  formal,  a  priori  and  neces- 
sary as  that  to  love  one's  neighbor.  And  this  is  the  more 
common-sense  English  view  of  obligation.8 

Ethics  does  not  command  actions,  but  gives  laws  for  the 
maxims  of  action;9  it  supplies  a  form  by  which  we  may  test 
our  maxims  to  see  whether  they  are  moral.  In  other  words, 
/Ethics  dictates  not  specific  acts,  but  principles.  J  Jurispru- 
dence, on  the  other  hand,  supplies  laws  for  particular  actions. 
C\s  a  result,  ethical  duties  are  of  indeterminate  (weiter)  obli- 
gation ;  juridical  duties  are  of  strict  obligation.  jEthics  gives 
a  law  that  one  shall  make  his  fellow  happy,  butieaves  to  his 
intellect  to  decide  the  means  thereto.  Jurisprudence  states 
a  law  that  commands  (or  more  generally,  forbids)  that  a 
specific  act  be  performed.1! 

1  Abbott,^.  1 23.  %  Ibid.,  p.  33.  *  Ibid.,  p.  291. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  275.  Kant  calls  Jurisprudence  a  doctrine  of  external  freedom;  at 
the  same  time  it  admits  of  a  spring  other  than  the  law,  i.  <?.,  is  a  heteronomous 
principle;  which  is  contradictory. 

5  Abbott,  p.  296.  6  Ibid.,  p.  297.  7  Ibid.,  p.  296. 

8  As  a  matter  of  fact,  reluctance  is  probably  the  commonest  and  best  test  of 
duty,  but  it  is  only  a  test;  Kant  mistook  its  ratio  cognoscendi  for  a  ratio  essendi. 

9  Abbott,  p.  299. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  300.  I  have  treated  only  of  so  much  of  the  "  Metaphysic  "  as  is 
found  in  Abbott's  translation. 


CONCLUSION 


THE  elements  of  the  system  outlined  by  Kant  may  be  tab- 
ulated thus : 

AUTONOMY 


£ 


Form. 
Absolute  Good— The  Good  Will- 
Determining  Principle  of  the  Will — Duty 
(which  is  a  form  of) — Law,  universal 
and  necessary 
Motive — Reverence  for  law 
Fundamental  Condition — Free  Will 
God 
Immortality 


Matter} 
A  particular  volition 
A  particular  duty  (an  action) 
A  particular  maxim 


Conditions  of  applicability  < 


r  i , 

o 

^WJ 

r     $ 

b 

<u 

a 
'5.  - 

a 

' 

O 

ci 

ffi 

B 

3 

G 

C 

"  o 

•v» 

SULTS 
rmal 

I 

g     - 

•  * 

S 

e 

1 

| 

r  * 

CO 

a 

#o 

o 

a 

O 

. 

O      4 

<u     1 

C 

I      <L> 

L  O 

This  is  the  system  of  Autonomy.     In  applying  it  in  prac- 
tice one  is  to  choose  his   maxim  according  to  his  sense  of 
66  [66 


67]  ELEMENTS  OF  KANT'S  ETHICS  6y 

duty  (#.  ^.,  the  idea  of  law  in  general)  ;  if  it  can  serve  as  a 
universal  law,  the  volition  and  the  resulting  action  are  good 
in  themselves.  The  difference  between  this  system  and  all 
others  is  that  the  latter  can  be  reduced  to  Heteronomy,  i.  e., 
in  the  last  analysis  to  a  system  in  which  the  principle  by 
which  the  will  is  determined  is  a  desire  for  happiness  (a  par- 
ticular). In  this  system  there  is  no  law,  and  the  sole  motive 
is  a  love  of  self.  Its  maxims  may  or  may  not  conform  to  the 
moral  law ;  they  cannot  be  moral.  Man  is,  in  Kant's  opinion, 
under  the  rule  of  reason ;  his  desires  need  to  be  restrained 
by  the  faculty  which  can  forecast  events.  On  this  account 
all  morality  takes  on  the  cast  of  law,  and  its  particular  eth- 
ical form  is  an  unconditioned  OUGHT. 

The  essential  of  Heteronomy  is  not  that  its  principle  pro- 
ceed from  without,  but  from  the  sensibility.  The  principal 
School  of  this  sort  in  Kant's  time  was  that  of  the  Moral 
Sense ;  of  this  I  have  spoken  at  the  beginning  of  Section  III. 
In  the  interest  of  Rationalism  Kant  attacks  this  theory,  tak- 
ing as  his  main  thesis  that  only  man's  reason,  not  his  sensi- 
bility, can  from  its  nature,  seek  the  good ;  and  to  uphold  this, 
he  denies  that  a  sense  can  ever  determine  man  to  seek  any- 
thing but  his  own  happiness.  Such-~an  expression  as  a 
"Sense  of  Duty"  to  him  is  unintelligible.  Kant's  whole 
theory,  therefore,  is  based  on  the  opposition  between  Reason  [^ 
and  Sense.  On  this  account  he  took  as  an  essential  of  duty 
what  is  probably  only  a  temporary  symptom,  namely  its 
undesirableness  from  the  standpoint  of  the  sensibility.  On 
the  other  hand,  as  he  himself  notes,  his  opponents  took  too 
little  account  of  the  existing  conflict  between  Interest  and 
Duty;  Kant  magnified  it,  they  minimized  it.  The  fact  of 
lasting  value  in  Kant's  theory  is  that  morality  is  an  attribute 
of  character;  the  important  point  in  the  opposing  theory  is 
that  the  ethical  conflict  is  but  temporary. 

1  Heteronomy  is  the  name  given  by  Kant  to  any  system  in  which  the  matter  is 
elevated  to  a  principle. 


3 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.00  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


N0V20W41M 


^Ss. 


tettjf 


»£a 


% 


'Mty APR  39  1043 


** 


^ 


NOV    2    !£J3 


'*, 


NOV   2  1943 


Ma- 


1^ 


te^. 


JUN    4 


- 


^~L~ 


Rt 


MAY  i 


— rr 

■ 


*..-c  o 


LD  21-100m 


-77cf9(io2s) 


>t  31037 


%m 


VSRStw' 


m< 


